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ABSTRACT 
Globalization and interdependencies have given rise to a new type of problem-some call 
them "wicked." Wicked problems are confounding experts in many disciplines of study. 
They are inherent to policy and strategic planning issues in civilian and military settings. 
The traditional, linear methods of problem solving are inadequate to address the 
complexity of wicked problems, and thus require new methods of problem solving. This 
thesis begins with a review of the definitions of wicked problems and strategies for 
coping with them. 
In order to demonstrate the utility of these concepts to a military audience, the 
building removal aspect of the Fort Ord base closure is utilized as an illustration of a 
wicked problem. The thesis first identifies the characteristics of a wicked problem in the 
Fort Ord case, and then proposes a strategy for coping with Fort Ord building removal. 
The Fort Ord example is not unique within the Department of Defense, and lessons 
learned from this illustration are applicable not only to other closed bases and to future 
rounds of base closure, but also to other issues marked by complexity and 
interdependence. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Globalization and interdependencies have given rise to a new type of problem-
some call them "wicked." Wicked problems are confounding experts in many disciplines 
of study. They find that the traditional, linear methods of problem solving are inadequate 
to address the complexity of wicked problems, and thus require new methods of problem 
solving. This thesis begins with a review of the definitions of wicked problems and the 
strategies for coping with them. 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified Fort Ord as a federal 
Superfund site in 1990 due to groundwater contamination discovered on the base. 
Shortly thereafter, in 1991, the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission 
recommended the closure of Fort Ord. In 1994, the California State Senate created the 
Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA) by special legislation to handle all aspects of the base 
closure, from building removal to assisting local cities with acquiring land. The local 
civilian community faces a daunting task of handling over 7 ,000 buildings on more than 
28,000 acres (44 square miles) left behind by the closure of the Ford Ord Military 
Reservation. 
Today, closure and reutilization of the former Fort Ord has reached a stalemate. 
The process continues to drain off scarce Department of Defense resources without 
resolution. It is in the nation's best interest to identify the obstacles to reutilization and to 
develop an efficient strategy to turnover the land at closed military bases to the local 
civilian community. 
xv 
Building removal at Fort Ord is an excellent example of a wicked problem and the 
strategies devised to cope with it can provide a useful template for officers to follow in 
the future. The challenges at Fort Ord are not unique within the Department of Defense, 
and lessons learned from this case are applicable, not only to other closed bases and to 













































LIST OF ACRONYMS 
Army Environmental Policy Institute 
Air Resources Board 
Bureau of Land Management 
Base Realignment and Closure 
Base Realignment and Closure Office 
California Environmental Protection Agency 
California Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act 
Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board 
California Integrated Waste Management Board 
Coordinated Resource Management Planning 
California State University 
California State University Monterey Bay 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
Department of Health Services 
Department of Defense 
Department of Pesticide Regulation 
Department of Toxic Substances Control 
Economic Development Administration 
Economic Development Conveyance 
Environmental Impact Statement 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Fritzsche Army Air Field 
Fort Ord Community Task Force 
Fort Ord Economic Development Authority 
Fort Ord Reuse Authority 
Fort Ord Reuse Group 
Finding of Suitability to Transfer 
Fort Ord Task Force 
Fort Ord Toxics Project 
Full-Time Equivalent 
Habitat Management Plan 
Housing and Urban Development 
Institute of National Security Studies 
lead-based paint 
Local Reuse Authority 
Monterey Peninsula College 
Monterey Salinas Transit 
National Environmental Policy Act 
Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District 
Military Construction 


















Monterey Peninsula Unified School District 
Monterey Regional Waste Management District 
Office of Economic Adjustment 
Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
Public Benefit Conveyance 
Presidio of Monterey 
Restoration Advisory Board 
Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study 
Regional Water Quality Control Board 
Strategic Management, Analysis, Requirements, and Technology 
State Water Resources Control Board 
Transportation Agency of Monterey County 
Training and Doctrine Command 
University of California 




The authors would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Anny 
Environmental Policy Institute (AEPI) through the U.S. Air Force Academy's Institute of 
National Security Studies (INSS) for allowing the authors to travel to San Francisco, 
Oakland, and Sacramento, California, and to Washington, D.C. for interviews with 
representatives of state and federal level executive government and regulatory agencies. 
The authors wish to acknowledge the tremendous assistance provided by 
Professor Nancy Roberts, without whom this thesis would not have been started, let alone 
completed. The invaluable assistance from Captain Frank Petho in all areas is also 
greatly appreciated. 
A vast majority of our research would not have been possible without the help of 
two people. Mr. Dick Wright at the Anny Environmental Policy Institute opened many 
doors for us in the Washington, D.C. area, and Mr. Stan Cook at the Fort Ord Reuse 
Authority introduced us to a long list of local government officials and regulatory 
agencies. Our research would have taken much longer without the assistance of Mr. 
Wright and Mr. Cook. 
We greatly appreciate the willingness of the stakeholders we interviewed to share 
their knowledge and experience in base closures with us. 
Finally, we wish to thank our families for the patient support they provided us in 
completing this project. 
xix 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xx 
I. INTRODUCTION 
No project leader is brilliant or experienced enough to go off and solve a 
wicked problem alone. 
E. Jeffrey Conklin and William Weil 
Due to the rapid increase in the speed of communications and transportation, 
globalization has become a buzzword of the age. The ease and speed with which 
interactions between individuals, organizations, corporations, and governments occur on 
a global basis have created unanticipated, yet in retrospect predictable consequences. 
There are two important perspectives from which to evaluate the unmistakable trend of 
increasing globalization. Globalization has fostered cooperation between seemingly 
unrelated groups and individuals separated by geography, economy, society, or culture. 
It has opened up a global market economy that encourages efficiency in production and 
trade. However, when conflicts arise, their resolution is much more difficult, because 
matters have become increasingly complex. 
The conventional, linear problem-solving methods of the past have failed to 
reliably resolve conflicts rooted in the elaborate interdependencies of globalization. The 
rising complexity of problem solving is an inevitable consequence of globalization, and 
has been reflected in a broad spectrum of literature including public administration, 
environmental policy, strategic planning, software development, political science, 
landscape architecture, health care, and organizational dynamics. While the authors of 
this literature may not all use the phrase "wicked problem," they all write about the 
complexity of the problem solving process and its challenges. 
1 
A. THREE TYPES OF PROBLEMS 
Nancy Roberts (2000) identified three t)rpes of problems.1 Type I or "simple" 
problems are solvable utilizing traditional, linear problem solving methods. There is one 
correct answer to the problem. As in a mathematical equation, if you know the values of 
all but one of the unknown variables, then you can solve for the remaining variable. 
There is a "right" answer, and following mathematical or analytical rules will reveal that 
answer. 
Type II or "complex" problems have a commonly agreed upon definition of the 
problem, but no consensus exists on the solution to the problem. For example, residents 
in a neighborhood may agree that there is a problem with speeding cars on their streets, 
but there might not be any consensus whether speed bumps, stop signs, or speed traps are 
the correct solution to the problem. 
Type III or "wicked" problems have four characteristics. First, there is no 
consensus on the definition of the problem. The definition of the problem depends on the 
perspective of the analyst. For example, a casual analysis of violence in American 
schools can lay the blame on a host of factors ranging from easy access to guns, lack of 
parental involvement in children's lives, or perhaps. exposure to violence on television 
and video games. Second, there is a vast and diverse group of stakeholders, each with 
different perspectives on the problem definition and problem solution. Additionally, the 
same stakeholders may have different resources to bring to bear on the problem solution. 
1 Nancy Roberts, "Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution," 
International Public Management Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2000): 1-4. 
2 
For example, in the violence in American school theme, some want to pass laws to stop 
the violence and control guns, while others want to put money into community 
development and programs for youth. Third, the constraints within which the 
stakeholders must work to solve the problem are continually shifting. The funding 
resources may vary with budgetary cycles, and political will may vary with elections or 
changing personalities due to personnel transfers within a bureaucracy. Finally, the 
fourth characteristic is that there is no consensus on the solution to the problem. 
Stakeholders in the conflict have a different perspective of the problem definition that is 
defined by their desired solution to the problem. In the school violence example, one 
group may argue that the solution to the problem is strict gun control laws, while another 
group may argue that the solution is regulations on violence in television and video 
games. 
B. OBSTACLES TO FORT ORD REUSE 
Closure and reutilization of the former Fort Ord has reached a stalemate. The 
process continues to drain off scarce Department of Defense resources without resolution. 
It is in the nation's best interest to identify the obstacles to reutilization so that we can 
develop a strategy to turnover the land at closed military bases to the local civilian 
community. The current stalemate that exists at Fort Ord signals that we are dealing with 
a wicked problem. 
There are many interrelated obstacles associated with Fort Ord base reuse. To 
convert the former Fort Ord into a qualitatively different conglomerate of properties and 
estates, the following issues require consideration: 
3 
• There are areas with significant amounts of unexploded ordinance and other 
dangerous items that were used to train soldiers for combat. 
• There are hundreds of World War II vintage buildings, which do not meet 
local civilian building codes and contain lead-based paint and asbestos 
insulation. 
• There is no agreement on the allocation of revenues from land sales and reuse. 
• There are different, often contradicting, proposals for land development. 
This research project grew out of two classes on wicked problems and environmental 
security offered by the National Security Affairs department at the Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, California. The professors divided the classes into teams and 
assigned topics for each team's project. Our team project focused on the building 
removal issue at Fort Ord. While this thesis focuses on the building removal aspect of 
Fort Ord reuse, it does not imply that the building removal aspect is more important than 
the other three obstacles mentioned above. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis addresses a simple research question: What are wicked problems and 
how do we cope with them? To illustrate its military applicability, the thesis will 
examine the following subsidiary research questions: Is building removal at the former 
Fort Ord a wicked problem? If so, what strategy should the Army employ to cope with 
it? 
D. STRUCTURE 
Chapter II is a review of wicked problems in academic literature. We define 
wicked problems, describe the principles of a coping strategy, and identify three types of 
4 
strategies used to cope with wicked problems. Chapter III utilizes the building removal 
issue at the former Fort Ord to illustrate the definition of a wicked problem. Chapter IV 
first describes previous strategies employed in Fort Ord base reuse planning and the 
results of these previous attempts. We then propose a new strategy for coping with 
wicked problems and provide a set of criteria to evaluate the implementation of the 
strategy. Finally, Chapter V draws conclusions from the illustration of the wicked 
problem at Fort Ord, identifies limitations of this thesis, and evaluates the applicability to 
base closure issues in general. 
E. METHODS 
This thesis is a study of wicked problems utilizing Fort Ord building removal as a 
case study. Primary and secondary source journal articles and textbooks on wicked 
problems, collaboration, and problem-solving theories provide the theoretical foundation 
for the research. Twenty-three interviews with primary sources involved in Fort Ord base 
closure form the database for the case. The stakeholder interview form in the Appendix 
allowed us to collect standard data about each stakeholder and simplified comparison of 
the interview results. Most interviews were conducted in person by both authors for 
increased inter-rater reliability. In cases where both authors were not present, we 
recorded the interview on microcassette and the absent interviewer listened to the 
interview. Information from various primary and secondary sources dealing with Fort 
Ord and BRAC-related issues supplemented the information obtained from the personal 
interviews. 
5 
It is important to understand that the objective of our thesis was not to identify a 
solution to the wicked problems at Fort Ord, but to identify a strategy for the stakeholders 
to independently reach a solution. We believe that if nothing else, this thesis will provide 
a new perspective to the stakeholders and we hope that it will open the door to further 
communication and understanding. Ultimately, this thesis can benefit others affected by 
current or future base closure. 
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II. WICKED PROBLEMS 
Some problems are so complex that you have to be highly intelligent and well informed 
just to be undecided about them. 
Laurence J. Peter 
A. INTRODUCTION 
"Wicked" problems have confounded problem-solving experts in various fields of 
expertise. This chapter reviews the concept of wicked problems in the academic 
literature and is partitioned into two sections. The first section identifies characteristics 
of wicked problems, and the second section discusses the principles and strategies for 
coping with wicked problems. 
B. THE NATURE AND DEFINITION OF WICKED PROBLEMS 
Although some people may smirk when they hear it for the first time, the phrase 
"wicked problems" has been in use amongst some strategic planning and policy experts 
for the past three decades. Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber from the University of 
California, Berkeley, first coined the phrase in 1973. 
Rittel and Webber (1973) observed that policy problems had a fundamentally 
different nature from problems of the past, and that any attempt to solve them from a 
scientific standpoint would fail. These new problems "are 'wicked' problems, whereas 
science has developed to deal with 'tame' problems. Policy problems cannot be 
7 
definitively described."2 There is no right or wrong answer to a wicked problem; there 
are only better or worse answers. 
In a pluralistic society there is nothing like the undisputable public 
good; there is no objective definition of equity; policies that respond to 
social problems cannot be meaningfully correct or false; and it makes no 
sense to talk about 'optimal solutions' to social problems unless severe 
qualifications are imposed first. Even worse, there are no 'solutions' in 
the sense of definitive and objective answers.3 
In 1981, Richard Mason and Ian Mitroff from the School of Business 
Administration at the University of Southern California expanded upon Rittel and 
Webber's description of tame versus wicked problems. In their strategic planning book,4 
they identified three characteristics of the complexity of modem policy making that give 
rise to wicked problems: 
1. Any policy-making situation is comprised of many problems and 
issues. 
2. These problems and issues tend to be highly interrelated. 
Consequently, the solution to one problem requires a solution to all 
the other problems. At the same time, each solution creates 
additional dimensions to be incorporated in the solutions to other 
problems. 
3. Few, if any, problems can be isolated effectively for separate 
treatment. s 
2 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of 
Planning," Policy Sciences, 4 (1973): 155. 
3 Ibid., 155. 
4 Richard Mason and Ian Mitroff, Challenging Strategic Planning Assumptions: 
Theory, Cases, and Techniques (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1981): vii. 
5 Ibid., 4-5. 
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Mason and Mitroff breakdown problems into three categories: simple, 
disorganized complex, and organized complex. Simple problems and problems of 
disorganized complexity both fall into Rittel and Webb er' s category of "tame" problems 
because they can be isolated effectively for separate treatment. Simple problems are 
"those that can be separated and reduced to relatively few variables and relationships ... 
Simple problems can be bounded, managed, and, as [Rittel and Webber put] it, 'tamed."'6 
Ironically, problems of the utmost complexity can also be tamed as 
long as the complexity is 'disorganized.' That is, whenever the number of 
variables is very large and the variables are relatively disconnected, the 
problem can be tamed with the elegant simplicity of statistical mechanics. 7 
Wicked problems are problems of organized complexity, and they are inherent to policy 
making and strategic planning. "The great difficulty with connected systems of 
organized complexity is that deviations in one element can be transmitted to other 
elements. In turn, these deviations can be magnified, modified, and reverberated so that 
the system takes on a kind of unpredictable life of its own."8 Due to the 
interdependencies between variables in organized complexity, one cannot attribute the 
source of unique variability to any given variable or any given subset of related variables. 
Thus, incapable of parsing the problem into unique sources of variability or 
interdependencies, the analyst is left facing the problem without the simplifying effects of 
modern multivariate statistical procedures. Subsequently, the organized complexity of 
wicked problems has two implications for policy making: 
6 Ibid., 5. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 6. 
9 
1. There must be a broader participation of affected parties, directly 
and indirectly, in the policy-making process. 
2. Policy making must be based on a wider spectrum of information 
gathered from a larger number of diverse sources.9 
Rittel and Webber (1973) and Mason and Mitroff (1981) were the only authors to 
write about wicked problems for the next ten years. In the last decade, wicked problems 
have become a more popular topic in a wide range of academic disciplines, and a surge of 
articles on wicked problems appeared during the 1990's. 
According to John Camillus (1996) from the University of Pittsburgh, strategic 
planning issues have a propensity to be wicked problems. 
Wicked problems cannot be effectively resolved using the classic, linear 
problem-solving process. Wicked problems and strategic issues possess 
the following characteristics: 
• The problem is not independent of the solution. 
• Multiple stakeholders with different and sometimes conflicting 
priorities exist. 
• Unexpected contingencies and hazards will inevitably be 
encountered. 
• Underlying factors givmg rise to a wicked problem are 
complex and intertwined, and cause and effect are difficult to 
distinguish. 
• No perfect or obviously right answer can be found. 
• Wicked problems and emerging strategic issues in a dynamic 
9 Ibid., 13. 
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world have few, if any, precedents that can help in responding 
to them.IO 
Judith Innes (1996), Director of the Institute of Urban and Regional Development 
at the University of California, Berkeley, wrote a response to the planning issues raised 
by Alan Altschuler three decades earlier. Altschuler challenged the legitimacy of 
comprehensive city planning and of city planner's expertise due to the complexity of 
modem planning issues. Although neither Altschuler nor Innes used the phrase, "wicked 
problem," the principles in their writing are very applicable to describing and coping with 
wicked problems. 
Innes wrote that current policy mandates public involvement, resulting m 
conflicting or uncoordinated action. 
Multiple local agencies and interests engage in either conflict or simply 
uncoordinated action .... Usually, state laws already mandate procedures 
for public involvement, and planning commissions and public hearings are 
the accepted forms of public review of plans. Many stakeholders, such as 
residents or businesses from neighboring jurisdictions, and state and 
federal regulatory agencies representing environmental or economic 
interests have little legitimacy as participants in local decisions about land 
use.I I 
Jeffrey Conklin and William Weil (1997) of Group Decision Support Systems, 
Inc. were the first to write specifically about the definition and tools for handling wicked 
problems since Rittel and Webber (1973). Conklin and Weil explain why the traditional, 
linear problem-solving methods of the past would not work with wicked problems and 
IO John C. Camillus, "Reinventing Strategic Planning," Strategy and Leadership 
(May/June 1995): 10. 
I I Ibid. 
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offer a few principles for dealing with wicked problems. 
Within organizations-such as corporations, institutions, and 
government-where lots of people work on complex issues, people are 
encountering a new class of much more difficult problems... We call 
these wicked problems because of the dynamic and evolving nature of the 
problem and the solution during the problem-solving process.12 
While the authors before this provided elaborate descriptions of wicked problems, 
Conklin and Weil provide a concise definition using four characteristics. 
• The problem is an evolving set of interlocking issues and 
constraints. Indeed, there is no definitive statement of the 
problem. You don't understand the problem until you have 
developed a solution. 
• There are many stakeholders-people who care about or have 
something at stake in how the problem is resolved. This makes the 
problem solving process fundamentally social. Getting the right 
answer is not as important as having stakeholders accept whatever 
solution emerges. 
• The constraints on the solutions, such as limited resources and 
political ramifications, change over time. The constraints change, 
ultimately, because we live in a rapidly changing world. 
Operationally, they change because many are generated by the 
stakeholders, who come and go, change their minds, fail to 
communicate, or otherwise change the rules by which the problem 
must be solved. 
• Since there is no definitive Problem, there is no definitive Solution. 
The problem-solving process ends when you run out of time, 
12 E. Jeffrey Conklin and William Weil, Wicked Problems: Naming the Pain in 
Organizations, Group Decision Support Systems, Inc., 1997, available [Online] 
<http://www.mmm.com/meetingnetwork/readingroom/ gdss _wicked.html> [29 January 
2001], page 4 of 14. Pages listed in this format refer to the page numbers when the 
website is printed out. 
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money, energy, or some other resource, not when some perfect 
solution emerges.13 
This thesis will use Conklin and Weil's definition of a wicked problem and summarize 
the four characteristics as follows: 
• There is no definitive statement of the problem. 
• There are many diverse stakeholders. 
• There are changing constraints within which to solve the problem. 
• There is no definitive solution to the problem. 
Given the nature and the definitive criteria of wicked problems, the next section identifies 
principles and strategies for coping with them. 
C. COPING WITH WICKED PROBLEMS 
1. Principles 
New tools are required to cope with wicked problems. It is especially difficult to 
cope with wicked problems, "using thinking, tools, and methods that are useful only for 
simpler problems."14 A coping strategy must be inherently non-linear, account for the 
social aspect of wicked problems, and utilize an evolving set of interlocking issues and 
constraints. Some authors such as Mason and Mitroff (1981), Conklin and Weil (1997), 
and Yankelovich (1999) have identified essential elements of a strategy to cope with 
wicked problems, but do not lay out an overarching strategy. Mason and Mitroff argue 
13 Ibid. 
14 lbid., I of 14. 
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that any strategy to cope with wicked problems must have four qualities: participation, 
adversity, integration, and support of the managerial mind. 
a. Four Qualities of a Coping Strategy 
The first quality of a coping strategy is participation. Participation, per 
se, is composed of two elements. The first element is obtaining knowledge and 
assumptions from all of the stakeholders in the process. 
Contained in the minds of each participant in a wicked problem are 
the powerful notions as to what is, what ought to be, why things are the 
way they are, how they can be changed, and how to think about their 
complexity. This represents a much broader class of information than is 
commonly used to solve problems of simplicity or of disorganized 
complexity. IS 
The second element is restating the knowledge and assumptions in objective terms for 
comparison and acceptance by the stakeholders as a group. 
Also, this participant based information is less likely to have been stated 
and recorded in a communicable form. Consequently ... this information 
must be "objectified"-explicitly, articulated-so that the basis for each 
party's judgments may be exchanged with others.16 
The second quality of a coping strategy is adversity. In other words, the 
participants in a wicked problem must clearly understand and use doubt. 
This does not mean that one should be a 'nay sayer' or a permanent 
skeptic. To do so would impede responsible action that must be taken. 
What it does imply is that one should withhold judgment on things until 
they have been tested. The methods ... are means for eliciting the reasons, 
rationale, and assumptions underlying the information used in complex 
problems. They may be used to test this information as welL 17 
15 Mason and Mitroff, 14. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 14-15. 
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The third quality of a coping strategy is integration. To be integrative, 
coping with wicked problems requires both analysis and synthesis. The task of analysis 
is" ... to subdivide a complex problem into its elements and to determine the nature of the 
linkages that give organization to its complexity," while the task of synthesis is " ... to 
understand the problem as a whole."18 
The fourth quality of a coping strategy is support of the managerial mind. 
Because wicked problems tend to be ongoing, it is important not only to provide 
managers with a decision support system, but also an understanding of the complexity in 
order to better cope with future wicked problems. Mason and Mitroff promote 
techniques that, "involved intensive immersion of managers and staff in the process."19 
b. Dialogue 
Dialogue is essential to achieve the four qualities of a coping strategy. 
Daniel Yankelovich (1999), a professor at the University of California at San Diego and 
chairman of the research firm, DYG Inc., acknowledges that dialogue, "is not, in fact, an 
instrument of decision making, which always involves considerations of power and 
interest-issues that interfere with dialogue. And it is not a negotiating device that seeks 
agreement leading to action."20 The principles of dialogue presented in his book are 
instrumental in c~eating a shared vision amongst a diverse group of stakeholders. 
"Dialogue is a process of successful relationship building."21 It is not, "a reversion to the 
18 Ibid., 15. 
19 Ibid., 16. 




participatory ideology of the 1960s with its insistence that everybody get involved in 
every decision, thus bringing decision making to a virtual halt. "22 Y ankelovich chose his 
words very carefully and emphasized the unique quality of dialogue. He drew two 
important distinctions. The first is the distinction between dialogue and debate. Debate, 
"is the opposite of dialogue. The purpose of debate is to win an argument, to vanquish an 
opponent," while, "in dialogue, all participants win or lose together."23 The second is the 
distinction between dialogue and discussion. Y ankelovich illustrates this distinction by 
identifying three distinct features of dialogue. "When all three are present, conversation 
is transformed into dialogue. When any one or more of the three features are absent, it is 
discussion or some other form of talk, but it is not dialogue."24 
The first distinct feature of dialogue is equality amongst the participants. 
In genuine dialogue, there is no arm-twisting, no pulling of rank, no hint 
of sanctions for holding politically incorrect attitudes, no coercive 
influences of any sort, whether overt or indirect. .. 
Mixing people of unequal status and authority does not necessarily 
preclude dialogue, but it makes it more difficult to achieve. Dialogue 
becomes possible only after trust has been built and the higher-ranking 
people have, for the occasion, removed their badges of authority and are 
participating as true equals. 25 
The second distinct feature of dialogue is listening with empathy. "The gift of empathy-
the ability to think someone else's thoughts and feel someone else's feelings-is 
indispensable to dialogue."26 The third distinct feature of dialogue is bringing 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 38. 
24 Ibid., 41. 
25 Ibid., 42. 
26 Ibid., 43. 
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assumptions into the open. "The most striking difference between discussion and 
dialogue is the process of bringing assumptions into the open while simultaneously 
suspending judgment."27 Harmony is not necessarily an outcome of dialogue. By 
bringing assumptions into the open, " ... disagreement may still exist, but the level of 
tension will be reduced and there will be better mutual understanding."28 
c. Satisficing 
Once the stakeholders achieve mutual understanding through dialogue, 
they will identify several feasible courses of action. The diversity of the stakeholders in a 
wicked problem "makes the problem solving process fundamentally social. Getting the 
right answer is not as important as having stakeholders accept whatever solution 
emerges. "29 One must realize when dealing with a wicked problem that there is no 
perfect solution. While there are better or worse solutions, the goal should be to stop 
when a solution is "good enough." In 1969, Herb Simon called this satisficing, whereby, 
"the nature of the design process is such that it is virtually impossible to find the best 
solution, because the space of the possible solutions is so large."30 
2. Strategies 
Other authors such as Fischer (1993), Innes (1996), and Roberts (2000) have 
proposed a handful of strategies for coping with wicked problems. Frank Fischer from 
Rutgers University recognized the inherent link between policy and wicked problems, 
and he suggested that collaboration would be the key to solving such problems. 
27 Ibid., 45. Emphasis added. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Conklin and Weil, 4of14. 
30 Ibid., 11 of 14. 
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Criticizing conventional conceptions of science and expertise, 
theorists advocating participatory democracy argue that the conventional 
model of professionalism based on a practitioner-client hierarchy must 
give way to a more collaborative method of inquiry. While such 
arguments have largely remained in the domain of utopian speculation, 
recent experiences with a number of 'wicked' policy problems have begun 
to suggest the viability, if not the necessity, of participatory research 
methods... collaborative citizen-expert inquiry may well hold the key to 
solving a specific category of contemporary policy problems.31 
Innes (1996) wrote that consensus building with stakeholders is the key to 
overcoming the wicked problems of urban planning. 32 
The emergence of consensus building as a method of deliberation has 
provided the opportunity to reformulate comprehensive planning. The 
practice is becoming more popular as a way to address complex, 
controversial public issues where multiple interests are at stake. 33 
She cites the growth of published materials on group dynamics and accomplishing 
tasks using alternative dispute resolution and reaching mutually beneficial agreements to 
support her assertion on the importance of consensus building. 
Consensus building has emerged parallel to the idea of 
"communicative rationality"... A decision is "communicatively rational" 
to the degree that it is reached consensually through deliberations 
involving all stakeholders, where all are equally empowered and fully 
informed, and where the conditions of ideal speech are met (statements are 
comprehensible, scientifically true, and offered by those who can 
legitimately speak and who speak sincerely). Communicatively rational 
decisions, then, are those that come about because there are good reasons 
for them rather than because of the political or economic power of 
particular stakeholders. 34 
31 Frank Fischer, "Citizen Participation and the democratization of policy 
expertise: From theoretical to practical cases," Policy Sciences 26 (1993): 165. 
32 Judith Innes, "Planning Through Consensus Building: A New View of the 
Comprehensive Planning Ideal," Journal of the American Planning Association, Vol. 62, 
No. 4 (Autumn 1996): 460. 
33 Ibid., 461. 
34 Ibid. 
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Like Mason and Mitroff, Innes believes in broader participation in the policy 
making process, and ushered wicked problems strategies into the urban planning arena. 
She proposes a new policy of providing incentives to bring stakeholders together, 
including "benefits for cooperation, and penalties or disadvantages for those stakeholders 
who do not participate."35 Once together, informed discussion ensues, shifting the 
previous, long-standing power base, providing legitimacy to all stakeholders, and thereby 
creating decisions that will benefit the whole. In each of the cases Innes used as 
examples, "informed and in-depth discussion occurred among a diversity of 
stakeholders... In most cases, they made decisions they collectively regarded as 
beneficial to the resource or to the system as a whole."36 Because the stakeholders come 
to the table with their own agendas, they want short-term results coupled to long-term 
implications. As a result, the planning process "should be issue-oriented and rooted in 
current tasks and problems, even while its goal is to develop general policies."37 
Recently, Nancy Roberts of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California, has drawn upon her experiences in Afghanistan with the United Nations to 
derive common elements of wicked problems and potential strategies. Roberts argues 
that there is no ideal strategy for solving all wicked problems and that the distribution of 
power in a given situation will determine what type of strategy would best solve a 
particular wicked problem. Roberts proposed three strategies for coping with wicked 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 469. 
37 Tuid. 
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problems: authoritative, competitive, and collaborative.38 To determine which strategy is 
best for a given situation, one must answer two questions. First, is power dispersed or 
concentrated amongst the stakeholders? If power is concentrated in one individual or one 
group, then the situation warrants an authoritative strategy. However, if power is 
dispersed, then one must address the second question. Do the stakeholders contest 
power? If power is uncontested, then the situation warrants a collaborative strategy. If, 
however, power is contested, then the strategy will likely be competitive. 
a. Authoritative Strategies 
The goal of an authoritative strategy is to effectively reduce the number of 
stakeholders involved in the decision-making process. "Authoritative strategies are 
'taming strategies.' They diminish the level of conflict inherent in wicked problems by 
putting problem solving into the hands of a few stakeholders who have the authority to 
define a problem and come up with a solution."39 On the one hand, this strategy has the 
advantage of reducing the complexity and amount of resources consumed in decision-
making. On the other hand, it has the disadvantage that the authority could be less 
informed and make poor decisions, causing litigation and stalemate. 
b. Competitive Strategies 
Competitive strategies are like a market economy. They are pluralistic 
and produce a "zero-sum" outcome: somebody will win and somebody will lose. These 
strategies have the advantage of promoting innovation and efficiency to get an advantage 
over a competitor. The disadvantages of competitive strategies can be drastic. "Pushed 
38 Roberts, "Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution," 8-12. 
39 lbid., 8. 
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to their extreme, they can provoke violence and warfare... Competition also consumes 
resources that could be spent on problem solving."40 
c. Collaborative Strategies 
The prisoner's dilemma41 is an example of a collaborative strategy. It 
discards the "zero-sum game" assumption of competition and adopts a "win-win" 
perspective. By working together, the stakeholders "can accomplish more as a collective 
than they can achieve by acting as independent agents."42 Collaborative strategies have 
the advantages of distributing costs, sharing benefits, and eliminating redundant efforts. 
Unfortunately, collaborative strategies also have the disadvantage of consuming precious 
resources in transaction costs. It takes time for the stakeholders to come together at a 
common location for meetings. It requires conference facilities, transportation costs, and 
the administrative costs of organizing and conducting the meetings. The stakeholder with 
very meager resources must gamble whether or not to spend those resources pursuing 
their own objectives or working together with other stakeholders in achieving common 
goals. For collaboration to work, the stakeholders must perceive that the increase in 
benefits by working together will outweigh the increased drain on resources to 
participate. 
40 Ibid., 10. 
41 The Prisoner's Dilemma is a game of competition versus cooperation. 
Available [Online] <http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/playground/pd.html> [28 March 
2001]. 
42 Roberts, "Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution," 12. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed the academic literature to describe first, the characteristics 
of wicked problems and second, potential strategies for coping with them. In the last 
decade, wicked problems have spread quickly into many seemingly unrelated academic 
fora. The phrase, "wicked problem," has not yet appeared in military literature, but the 
time has come to introduce it. We use a base closure case to illustrate its applicability to 
military issues and challenges. 
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III. DESCRIPTION OF A WICKED PROBLEM: FORT ORD 
BUILDING REMOVAL 




The previous chapter draws on the literature to provide a general overview of 
wicked problems and how one can cope with them. This chapter uses the case of 
building removal at Fort Ord to demonstrate the concept's utility and applicability to a 
military audience. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The former Fort Ord is located on the Monterey Bay in California. In 1917, the 
U.S. Army obtained land primarily used for agricultural purposes and converted it to land 
used as a maneuver and training ground for field artillery and cavalry troops stationed at 
the Presidio of Monterey. The Army made permanent improvements, such as 
administrative buildings, barracks, mess halls, and a sewage treatment plant in the late 
1930s. In 1940, after obtaining additional land in 1938, the Army began construction on 
the Main Garrison. Since most of the construction met emergent training requirements 
during World War II, the Army hastily constructed these buildings without consideration 
of their permanent nature. 
Initially, Fort Ord served as a facility for training and staging infantry troops. 
Then, from 1947 to 1975, it was a basic training center. In the early 1960s, Fritzsche 
Army Airfield (F AAF) was completed, and after 197 4, the ?1h Infantry Division occupied 
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Fort Ord.43 With up to 15,000 active duty military personnel and 5,100 military family 
members residing there at any one time during its active history, developed areas of Fort 
Ord resembled a medium-sized city with family housing, medical facilities, warehouses, 
office buildings, industrial complexes, and gas stations. 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified Fort Ord as a federal 
Superfund site in 1990 because of groundwater contamination discovered on the base. 
Shortly thereafter, the 1991 Department of Defense (DoD) Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC) Commission recommended the closure of Fort Ord. In August 1993, 
the ?1h Infantry Division (Light) was relocated to Fort Lewis, Washington,44 and one 
month later, the Secretary of Defense declared that the reuse efforts at Fort Ord would 
serve as the national model for base conversion. 
Fort Ord closed in September 1994. The Army retained approximately five 
percent of the property for a Presidio of Monterey (POM) Annex and reserve center. The 
base closure left behind over 7,000 buildings on more than 28,000 acres, or 44 square 
miles. The surrounding communities are to integrate the land that falls into two 
categories and five geographic regions as identified in Table 1 on the following page.45 
43 Fort Ord Reuse Group, Preliminary Draft Initial Base Reuse Plan (Marina: 
Fort Ord Reuse Group, 17 December 1992), 3. 
44 John Pike, History of the ih Infantry Division, Federation of American 
Scientists website, 27 July 1999, available [Online] 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/guard/7 _div/long_history.htm> [2 April 2001]. 
45 The information in Table 1 was derived from the Former Fort Ord 
Environmental Cleanup website, Information & History - Land Use, available [Online] 
<http://www.fortordcleanup.com/landuse.shtml#top> [20 April 2001]. 
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Land Geographic 
Category Region Description and Facilities 
ueve opeo Lano cast uarr1son • 350 acres located on the northeast side of the 
base. adjacent to undeveloped training areas. 
•Includes tactical vehicle storage facilities, defense 
recycling and disposal areas. a sewage treatment 
plant, and a small arms range . 
• Twenty-five acres of the East Garrison will remain 
as recreational open space . 
rl"\l"I i- • 1nc1uaes a1rstr1p, motor parK. aircrart rue1ing 
facilities. sew age treatment plant. aircraft 
maintenance facilities. air control tower. fire and 
rescue station, and aircraft hangars . 
Marn 1.1oarr1son • ;:.cnoo1s, a nosp1ta1, nous1ng. comm erc1a1 1acil1t1es. 
motor pools. and machine shops. California 
Highway 1 separates the Main Garrison from the 
Coastal Zone . 
v no eve 10 p e o (.;Oas ta 1 • ::;anc aunes oetween M1gnway i ano tne Monterey 
Land Bay shoreline . 
• Because of rare and endangered animal and plant 
species. and because of its scenery, the Coastal 
Zone is designated as an environmentally 
sensitive area . 
• Many consider the beach dunes one of the best 
coastal dunes in California, because of its coastal 
strand vegetation and the am cunt of natural dune 
habitat. 
1n1a no • unaeve1opea 1ano rn tne 1n1ano portions or tne 
base. 
. Includes infantry training areas and open areas 
used for livestock grazing and recreational 
activities such as hunting, fishing, and cam ping. 
. The Multi-Range Area (MRA) occupies a large 
portion of this undeveloped land, and it was 
primarily used for advanced military training 
operations. 
Table 1. Land Category, Geographic Region, and Description 
and Facilities at the Former Fort Ord. 
C. PLANNING FOR FORT ORD REUSE 
The cities of Seaside and Marina along with the County of Monterey formed the 
Fort Ord Economic Development Administration (FOEDA) to begin community 
planning in anticipation of the base closure. When it was determined that the cities of 
Monterey, Del Rey Oaks, and Sand City would also be receiving property from Fort Ord, 
they joined Marina and Seaside, and established the Fort Ord Reuse Group (FORG). 
FORG submitted its Initial Base Reuse Plan to the Army on 24 March 1993. Cities 
within Monterey County that were not included in FORG expressed concern that FORG 
would try to develop too much, and that it would have an adverse impact on them 
through effects such as increased automobile traffic and air pollution. To ensure that 
planning for Fort Ord Reuse considered the broad impact on the region and not just on 
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the cities adjacent to Fort Ord, in April 1994, the California State Senate created the Fort 
Ord Reuse Authority (FORA) to prepare, adopt, finance, and implement a base reuse 
plan.46 The 13-member FORA Board consists of the members of its predecessor-
FORG-plus additional representatives from the cities of Carmel-by-the-Sea, Pacific 
Grove, and Salinas.47 Additionally, there are non-voting members on the Board, such as 
the Executive Director of the local reuse authority and the Army Installation Commander. 
FORA completed an updated Fort Ord Base Reuse Plan in June 1997.48 
The Base Reuse Plan defines land uses and specifies the estimated acreage and 
intended purpose of the land:49 
• 18,000 acres for the endangered species habitat (61 percent) 
• 4,000 acres for parks, open space, visitor serving, and public facility uses (13 
percent) 
• 2,300 acres for educational or research uses (8 percent) 
• 2,000 acres for new and (remodeled) existing residential units including 
single-family homes, apartments, and other housing facilities (7 percent) 
• 1,500 acres for business and retail (5 percent) 
• 1,100 acres for infrastructure/rights of way (4 percent) 
46 Steve Endsley, Director of Planning & Redevelopment, and Standen Cook, 
Facilities Leasing/Project Implementation Manager, Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA), 
interview by the authors, 6 April 2001, Marina, California. 
47 The cities of Seaside and Marina each have two voting members on the FORA 
Board and the County of Monterey has three. 
48 For more information, see the FORA and Former Fort Ord Environmental 
Cleanup websites. Available [Online] <www.fora.org> and 
<www.fortordcleanup.com/reuseplanning.shtml> [19 April 2001]. 
49 Fort Ord Reuse Authority, Base Reuse Plan, available [Online] 
<http://www.fora.org/base.html> [2 April 2001]. Percentages in parentheses were 
calculated based on an estimated 29.700 total acres. 
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• 800 acres retained by the Army (3 percent) 
According to the Base Reuse Plan, about 35,000 people will be living at the 
former Fort Ord by the year 2015. This is approximately the same population as was 
present on the base when it was an active military installation. Moreover, the Base Reuse 
Plan projects the creation of about 18,400 new jobs by the year 2015.50 
D. LAND CONVEYANCE 
Most of the land at the former Fort Ord is still under the jurisdiction of the U.S. 
Department of the Army. In the past, "private parties rarely bid on the purchase of base 
properties because communities often request these properties under public benefit 
transfers, economic development conveyances, and noncompetitive negotiated sale 
authorities."51 A Public Benefit Conveyance (PBC) can transfer land formerly under 
military control to state and local government agencies, and to non-profit institutions that 
benefit the public. These agencies and institutions obtained the property at no cost. 
Beginning in 1994, the Department of Defense was authorized by Congress to use an 
Economic Development Conveyance (EDC) to transfer property "at below fair market 
value."52 Under the PBC and EDC programs, the Army has either conveyed or approved 
conveyance for the following property: 
50 Ibid. 
51 U. S. Government Accounting Office, Military Bases: Update on the Status of 
Bases Closed in 1988, 1991, and 1993, Letter Report, 08/06/96, GAO/NSIAD-96-149 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), 1. Available [Online] 
<http://www.fas.org/man/gao/ns96149.htm> [2 April 2001]. 
52 Katy Podagrosi, "Economic Renewal: Community Reuse of Former Military 
Bases," DefenseLINK, April 21, 1999, available [Online] 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/reuse042 l 99 .html> [26 September 2000]. 
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• To the California State University system as an EDC for California State 
University Monterey Bay (CSUMB), 
• To the University of California as an EDC for the University of California 
Monterey Bay Education, Science, and Technology Center (UCMBEST), 
• To the City of Marina as a PBC for its municipal airport, 
• To the California Department of Parks and Recreation as a PBC for creation 
of the Fort Ord Dunes State Park, and 
• To several homeless service providers as a PBC. 
Katy Podagrosi, former mayor of Rantoul, Illinois, where Chanute Air Force Base 
was closed in 1993, argued that the EDC process was cumbersome and suggested that the 
government take additional steps to accelerate land transfers. 
A policy of no-cost EDCs will eliminate these time-consuming steps, 
thereby speeding property transfer and reuse and reducing DoD' s cost to 
maintain and operate the property. This policy also will reduce somewhat 
the daunting costs of reusing former military bases, allowing communities 
to invest more quickly in infrastructure modernization and 
redevelopment. 53 
On 5 October 1999, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000 
"provided for no-cost transfers of EDC property in order to further stimulate economic 
redevelopment and long-term job creation and to eliminate delays resulting from 
prolonged negotiations over fair market value."54 In the case of Fort Ord, however, it has 
not produced the anticipated results, in part due to an unresolved issue of preexisting 
buildings. 
53 Ibid. 
54 U.S. Army, Base Realignment and Closure Office (BRACO), No-Cost 
Economic Development Conveyance (EDC) Policy Guidance Overview, 13 December 
1999, available [Online] 
<http://www.hqda.army.mil/acsimweb/brac/web/data/edc/3 .doc> [2 April 2001]. 
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E. THE BUILDING REMOVAL ISSUE 
Environmental restoration is a precondition for realizing various aspects of 
the Fort Ord reuse plan. 
Andrew Szasz and Michael Meuser 
Part of FORA's challenge is deciding what to do with roughly 1,200 remaining 
World War II era structures that do not meet local civilian building codes and contain 
hazardous materials such as asbestos and lead-based paint (LBP). While there are 
valuable materials such as old growth lumber in the buildings, removing, salvaging, and 
diverting non-hazardous materials from the waste stream will concentrate the hazardous 
materials in that stream with attendant potential, unintended consequences. 
Asbestos contained in the buildings poses a serious risk during building 
demolition. Activities that disturb asbestos, such as cutting, sanding, or other remodeling 
activities performed while demolishing or removing a building can release high levels of 
airborne asbestos fiber. Medical research has documented the adverse impact of airborne 
asbestos on human respiratory health. 
Because asbestos removal is very expensive and poses the greatest risk of fiber 
release, it should be the last option exercised, unless required by state or local 
regulations. However, removal may be necessary when remodeling a building or when it 
is impossible to repair damaged asbestos material. Asbestos removal is difficult and 
dangerous, and it requires a specially trained, licensed contractor. Removal per se is 
expensive in and of itself, but it is only a part of the complete process. After removal, 
disposal of asbestos materials adds additional expense. Waste contractors may deposit 
asbestos materials in the Class III landfill in Marina, as long as they seal it in double-
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bags. While the tipping fee55 at the landfill for regular municipal waste is $30 per ton, 
double-bagged asbestos requires special handling at the landfill and costs $45 per ton. 
The second hazardous material associated with these buildings is LBP. The 
primary hazard of LBP is to the brain development of children. LBP chips, as well as 
soil and household dust contaminated with lead are the primary sources of childhood lead 
poisoning. Children could eat, chew, or suck on lead-painted surfaces they can reach, 
such as windowsills or railings. However, demolition jobs present these hazards to adult 
workers as well. Dirt and dust can contain lead, as can the fumes and dust stirred up 
during building renovation or while sandblasting lead-painted buildings. According to 
most experts, lead either absorbed through the skin or inhaled as a dust are the most toxic 
routes of exposure. Moreover, workers exposed to lead have an increased risk of 
developing Alzheimer's disease, according to the American Academy ofNeurology.56 
Since 1978, the Army has built an additional 2,916 housing units in compliance 
with building codes; that is without using these hazardous materials. The Army has 
turned over many of those housing units to the local community for rent to the public, but 
they still have not turned over approximately 1,100 units.57 The local community could 
55 Landfills pay for their operations by charging tipping fees. When trucks bring 
in a load of waste to deposit in the landfill, the truck drives onto a scale to determine the 
weight of the waste. The amounts listed in the text are the tipping fees for the Monterey 
Regional Waste Management District. 
56 Reuters Health, Workers Exposed to Lead Have High Alzheimer's Risk, 4 May 
2000, available [Online] <http://www.alzheimers.com/news/200005044801.html> [26 
September 2000]. 
57 Standen Cook, Facilities Leasing/Project Implementation Manager, Fort Ord 
Reuse Authority (FORA), interviews with the authors, various dates from August 2000 to 
March 2001, Marina, California. 
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have easily reused those housing units shortly after the closure of Fort Ord, but they now 
face inordinate costs for repairs following years of neglect while awaiting transfer. 
The Army was ready to transfer the land shortly after the base closed, but the 
FORA Board did not want to receive land with buildings intact. The Base Reuse Plans 
mentioned above address allocation of land to residential, commercial, or industrial use, 
but they did not address how to transform the land from its present state to the desired 
state defined in the plan. In other words, the plans did not take into consideration the 
removal or remediation of buildings. 
People expected and hoped that the actual land transfer would occur quickly, but 
unfortunately, this has not happened. Because of the delays, the salvageable materials 
contained in the buildings are deteriorating and losing value, and the hazards, such as 
peeling lead-based paint, are worsening and becoming more costly to cleanup. 
F. FORT ORD BUILDING REMOVAL IS A WICKED PROBLEM 
As we summarized in Chapter II, there are four key characteristics of a wicked 
problem58: 
• The problem is ill defined, 
• It has many diverse stakeholders with different perspectives and points of view, 
• Its constraints constantly change, and 
• It has no definitive solution. 
58 Conklin and Weil, 4of14. 
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The building removal issue at the former Fort Ord provides an excellent example of these 
four characteristics, and we will use it to help us understand the nature of wicked 
problems. 
1. No Problem Definition 
There is no agreement on the definition of the problem. First, there is no 
agreement whether or not the existing buildings must be either remediated or removed. 
Second, if there is a requirement to remove or remediate the buildings, there is neither 
agreement as to who bears the responsibility, nor is there agreement on what method to 
use in accomplishing the remediation or removal. 
a. Agreement to Remove or Remediate 
There is a large and diverse group of stakeholders with differing and 
sometimes competing interests in the issue of building removal. The Army uses similar 
buildings at many other bases throughout the country, so from its perspective, there is no 
requirement for building removal. The policy of the Army is that the buildings come 
with the land at transfer, "as-is, where-is." However, the Army did not build these 
buildings according to local building codes and regulations, so they have less value for 
use in the civilian sector. The potential developers want land free of these buildings, so 
from their perspective, there is a requirement to remove the buildings. 
b. Responsibility 
The Army uses the criteria: If the Army was going to keep this land, then 
what would the Army do with the buildings? The Army would use the buildings in their 
current state. The policy of the Army's Base Realignment and Closure Office (BRACO) 
is that they are required to notify the local community of the existence of hazardous 
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materials in the buildings, but not to abate such hazardous materials. After all, 
approximately 94 percent of the residential housing in San Francisco was built before 
1978 and probably contains LBP. If the Army expends scarce resources to abate the 
hazardous materials from the buildings, then the Army would be improving the land 
value for the sake of the local community. The Army believes that whoever receives this 
land is getting a good deal. The inherent value of the land is greater than the cost of 
remediating the buildings.59 For example, no one would build a new sewer system if 
there were a leaking sewer pipe. It would make sense to simply patch the pipe to make 
the sewer system functional. Building a new sewer system to fix a leaking pipe is really 
redeveloping for the economic benefit of the follow on user, which is not the Army's 
responsibility. 
The Army also believes that the requirement to cleanup the land depends 
on the intended reuse of the land. The Army should not pay to clean the land to the high 
standards of residential zoning if the community intends to zone the land for commercial 
or industrial use. Likewise, it is not the Army's responsibility to tum over land cleaned 
to the standard of new zoning if the local communities want to change the zoning of the 
land. The Army has agreed that if the community zones the land for residential use, then 
they will comply with Housing and Urban Development (HUD) requirements and take 
59 At the Military Bases and Community Partnerships: Maintaining California's 
Edge conference on 10 April 2001 in Monterey, California, Leon Panetta said that such 
claims by the Army are "bullshit," and that the cost of the environmental cleanup negates 
the financial benefit of receiving the land through a no-cost EDC. 
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samples to determine the level of contamination, but they will not clean the area to 
residential standards.60 
From the perspective of the local communities, a city would not want to 
spend several times their annual budget to develop this land. For the City of Marina, it is 
much more attractive to develop other adjacent areas with no such cleanup costs. The 
Anny obtained the land at minimal cost.61 The Anny spent the nation's tax dollars to put 
the buildings there, to paint them (with LBP), and to insulate them (with asbestos), so the 
local community should not have to pay to remove the buildings and hazardous materials 
now. The building removal costs are estimated in the tens of millions of dollars-a very 
small fraction of the Anny's several billion-dollar budget. 
The local developers want the land, but do not want the liability involved 
with hazardous material abatement. For the developers to accept the liabilities, the 
perceived benefits must greatly outweigh any potential risks. Developers are hesitant to 
be the first to accept the challenge and take the risk. Thus far, developer conferences 
have been unsuccessful in finding any contractors to start the process. It would be much 
easier, and not to mention economically beneficial, for them to get land without the 
buildings. The local community eagerly accepted transfer of land that did not require 
modification before reuse. For example, the Sun Bay Apartments and the Bayonet and 
60 Richard Seraydarian, Superfund Division, Federal Facilities Cleanup Branch, 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 9, interview by the authors, 1 
March 2001, San Francisco, California. 
61 Joe Cavanaugh, The Peace Dividend: Defense Conversion through Higher 
Education (Monterey: The Leon Panetta Institute, 2000), 9. 
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Black Horse golf course were both sold and reused "as-is," which was without risk to the 
new owners. No developers are willing to accept the remaining land "as-is." 
c. Method 
Four alternatives comprise the protocol for handling Fort Ord's buildings: 
use-in-place, move, deconstruct, or demolish. In other words, the most desirable action is 
to use the buildings in place. This alternative costs less, takes less time, and has the least 
impact on the environment, both in the release of hazardous materials to the environment 
and less total waste going to a landfill. Moving the buildings could have similar benefits 
to the environment, but it would cost more time and money. Deconstructing would 
incrementally increase the risk to the environment, and increase costs in terms of time 
and resources. Finally, demolition of the building would have the most adverse impact 
on the environment and would cost the most in time and money. The protocol is not 
mandatory, but following it to the maximum extent possible not only lessens the adverse 
environmental impact, it helps transform a military base to a thriving part of the 
surrounding community. Additionally, following the protocol should increase 
stakeholder acceptance of solving the problem due to the aforementioned reasons. 
2. Many Diverse Stakeholders 
The previous section described the lack of agreement on a problem definition and 
summarized the arguments of three broad groups of stakeholders: the Army, the local 
community, and the developers. The vast quantity and diversity of the stakeholders 
involved further complicates this issue. It is difficult to circumscribe the boundaries of 
the many individuals and organizations that have a stake in the outcome of building 
removal and land reuse at the former Fort Ord. To include some in the problem-solving 
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process while excluding others invites dissent and possible litigation. Every citizen who 
believes they have an interest in the outcome of an issue is a stakeholder and a major task 
associated with resolving a wicked problem is identifying the stakeholders and including 
them in the decision making process, either by direct participation or by representation. 
Ed Freeman defines a stakeholder as, "any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of an organization's purpose."62 Nancy Roberts adds that, 
" ... stakeholders are any individuals or groups, whether internal or external, adversarial or 
not, that have the potential to 'make a difference' to the organization."63 Roberts and 
King's stakeholder audit format provides the framework for the identification of the 
stakeholders and their interests in the current case. 
An interview with Stan Cook at FORA set our stakeholder audit in 
motion. He provided us with a preliminary list of the organizations involved in Fort Ord 
reuse and the points of contact for each organization. Our stakeholder audit initially 
focused on the local and regional levels. Figure 1, on the next page is a map of the Fort 
Ord reuse stakeholders from the perspective of these levels. From this perspective, the 
stakeholders fall into one of three groups: 
• A core group comprised of each of the local city mayors and the County of 
Monterey (FORA board). 
• An "insider" group that advises the core group. This group consists of 
representatives from the regulatory agencies and other groups with perceived 
legitimacy. 
62 Nancy C. Roberts and Paula J. King, "The Stakeholder Audit Goes Public," 
Organizational Dynamics (1989): 64-65. 
63 Ibid., 65. 
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• An "outer ring" of individuals or organizations. This is the largest group and 
is comprised of everyone who feels they have a stake in Fort Ord reuse-quite 
possibly all people from every city that borders Fort Ord-but whose opinions 
are not necessarily considered. 
Figure 1. Satellite Diagram of Local Level Stakeholders in Fort Ord Reuse 
The project's scope then broadened to examine the state and federal levels of 
stakeholder involvement. Figure 2, on the next page depicts the stakeholders broken 
down into the local, regional, state, and federal levels. While the regional and state levels 
are comprised of regulatory agencies that have oversight of reuse issues; the federal level 
is comprised of various offices and agencies of the legislative and executive branches of 
government. The federal level stakeholders are responsible for initiating and 
implementing the BRAC process and establishing federal environmental standards, and 
they have control over a significant amount of financial resources. 
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Figure 2. Stakeholders in Fort Ord Reuse by Level of Analysis 
For the most part, the regulatory agencies at all levels have a "wait-and-see" 
attitude. Although each agency has published standards, they approach reuse issues 
reactively: they wait for a rendered decision, then judge whether the decision's outcome 
meets their agency's standards. Additionally, there are unclear and sometimes 
contradictory regulations. These stakeholders are important to include in the decision 
making process because they could promote plans that comply with their agency's 
regulations and can provide timely clarification of ambiguous or contradictory 
regulations. It would be ineffective and a waste of both time and money to develop a 
plan that does not comply with environmental standards or regulations. 
The following sections provide brief descriptions of many of the stakeholders 
shown in Figures 1 and 2 above to illustrate their diversity and interests in the present 
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case. It is important to note that this is not an all-inclusive list, and we present it in no 
order of priority. The list begins with local level stakeholders and expands to the federal 
level of stakeholders. 64 
a. Fort Ord Reuse Authority Board 
The State of California established the FORA Board. It is comprised of 
the following voting members: The Monterey County Supervisor, who acts as the head of 
the Board, and the Mayors from the various surrounding cities, who make up the majority 
of the Board. The Board also consists of the following non-voting members: U.S. 
Representative Sam Farr, State Senator Bruce McPherson, Assemblyman Fred Keeley, 
Transportation Agency of Monterey County (TAMC), Monterey Peninsula Unified 
School District (MPUSD), University of California (UC), California State University 
(CSU), U.S. Army, Monterey Peninsula College (MPC), and Monterey Salinas Transit 
(MST).65 For an initial vote by the FORA Board to be binding upon the members of the 
Board, the vote must be unanimous. If the initial vote fails to achieve a unanimous result, 
then the Board must wait 30 days before its' members can vote again, and a two-thirds 
majority is enough to carry the vote. 
b. Mayor of Marina 
Mayor Perrine sees the problem as one of a large number of stakeholders, 
64 It was interesting to note that every stakeholder interview conducted for this 
study identified more potential stakeholders. This led to interviews with more 
stakeholders than were on the initial list provided by Stan Cook at FORA. At some point, 
we had to stop the additional interviews and simply make a note of the existence of yet 
another potential stakeholder. 
65 Fort Ord Reuse Authority, FORA Facts, 11 May 2000, available [Online] 
<http://www.fora.org!foral.html> [8 April 2001]. 
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the sheer magnitude of the project itself (removing 1,200 buildings), and the volume of 
waste and hazardous material produced (asbestos and LBP). In addition, there may be a 
high environmental cost involved, but no one knows who will assume the cost and 
burden of the project. He believes that building removal must occur and that it must be 
safe and effective. 
He believes in an authoritative strategy, with the FORA Board as the 
authority, and he would be willing to share authority with anyone investing funds in the 
project. His strategy is straightforward, but simplistic: use proceeds from land sales to 
fund future building removal. However, to implement this strategy, the FORA Board 
must cooperate with FORA to increase available capital. In other words, FORA and the 
regulatory agencies must interact more closely, and state and federal agencies, too, must 
interact more closely at their level.66 
c. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District 
"In 1969, the state designated the three counties of Monterey, San Benito, 
and Santa Cruz as the North Central Coast Air Basin, a single region sharing the same air 
pollution problems. A year later, the federal Clean Air Act formalized the responsibility 
of state and local governments to manage air quality in their regions. "67 The Monterey 
Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District (MBUAPCD) has jurisdiction over the North 
Central Coast Air Basin and "is responsible for air monitoring, permitting, enforcement, 
long-range air quality planning, regulatory development, education and public 
66 Mayor Jim Perrine of Marina, interview by David Luckey, 31 July 2000, 
Marina, California. 
67 Sun Star Media, Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District, 1999-
2001, available [Online] <http://www.mbuapcd.org/> [3 April 2001]. 
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information activities related to air pollution. "68 The district is responsible for airborne 
emissions from stationary sources. This includes devices that are portable, but are 
stationary when in operation and producing airborne emissions. For example, the district 
would have permit authority if a contractor desired to use a wood chipper or sand blaster 
on the buildings at Fort Ord. 
MBUAPCD has two areas of concern with respect to the present case. 
First, they are concerned about the method of remediation or removal of the buildings 
and whether that method would cause excessive emissions from machinery or cause lead 
or asbestos to become airborne and present a health risk to the community. Second, they 
are concerned with the zoning of the land for what will take the place of the buildings 
because they model and regulate the airborne emissions from residential, commercial, 
and industrial zones. 69 
d. Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board 
The mission of the Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board 
(RWQCB) is "to preserve and enhance the quality of California's water resources, and 
ensure their proper allocation and efficient use for the benefit of present and future 
generations." The Board establishes regulations for water quality within its jurisdiction, 
and it is responsible for enforcing federal, state, and regional regulations on water quality. 
It is important to understand that the Board does not set regulations merely for the 
environment's sake. The Board listens to what the local communities want to do with 
68 Ibid. 
69 Fred Thoits and Mary Giraudo, Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control 
District, interview by Kevin Schultz, 4 August 2000, Monterey, California, tape 
recording. 
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water sources (e.g., water sports and recreation, marine wildlife refuge, cooling for a 
power plant) and then establishes regulations on waste streams to the water so that the 
water is safe for its intended use by human inhabitants. In the present case, the Board is 
most concerned with groundwater contamination near landfills. If contractors take the 
demolished or deconstructed building materials to local landfills, then the Board will be 
concerned with the potential for hazardous materials (primarily lead) to leach through the 
liner of the landfill into the local water table.70 
e. Monterey Regional Waste Management District 
The Monterey Regional Waste Management District is a public agency 
that manages the landfill in Marina, California, just north of the former Fort Ord. The 
District provides waste management services to an estimated 170,000 people living in the 
853 square miles from Moss Landing to Big Sur on the central coast of California.71 The 
facilities at the landfill in Marina serve two purposes. First, they provide recycling 
services to reduce the flow of waste into the landfill, and second, they provide a dumping 
ground for all the waste generated in the District. It is a Class III landfill for municipal 
waste, so accepting hazardous waste is unauthorized. However, it is the responsibility of 
the waste generator to determine if the waste is hazardous. The District's interest in the 
present case is that materials in the buildings are used or reused to the highest extent 
70 Frank DeMarco, Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board 
(CCRWQCB), interview by Kevin Schultz, 18 August 2000, San Luis Obispo, California, 
tape recording. 
71 Monterey Regional Waste Management District (MRWMD), District Facts, 
available [Online] <http://www.mrwmd.org/> [8 April 2001]. 
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possible instead of being deposited in the landfill, and if not reused then to be provided a 
place in the landfill. 72 
f. Fort Ord Reuse Authority 
California State Bill SB899 established FORA as required to meet federal 
legislation with regard to establishing a local reuse authority for the creation and 
implementation of a reuse plan and accepting land from the Department of the Army for 
turnover to the local communities. FORA is tasked to act as the intermediary between 
the Army (federal level) and the FORA Board (local level). FORA's responsibilities 
include advising the FORA Board, drafting plans for use by the Board, accepting land 
from the Army, and transferring it to the FORA Board. While FORA is proactively 
involved, they are hamstrung by a lack of authority to implement a plan. 
Michael Houlemard is the Executive Director of FORA. FORA is directly 
responsible for the transfer of land and for building deconstruction, for which Mr. 
Houlemard established the building deconstruction protocol. However, there is currently 
no ability to enforce it. Mr. Houlemard believes FORA has three primary functions. The 
first function is planning. The second function is ensuring conformity with all local, 
state, and federal rules and regulations. The third function is the implementation and 
financing, specifically in the areas of land sales, leasing, contracting, setting costs for 
developers, and receiving and spending grants. 
U.S. Representative Sam Farr supports FORA as the lead agency in Fort 
72 William Merry, Monterey Regional Waste Management District (MRWMD), 
interview by Kevin Schultz and Cristina Matei, 4 August 2000, Marina, California, tape 
recording. 
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Ord reuse. Mr. Houlemard sees himself and FORA as the authority on reuse issues, with 
the money and creditability to successfully accomplish the task, and he believes the only 
obstacle to conveyance is competition between the FORA Board members. The 
consensus among the FORA Board members is that they can make the decisions 
themselves. It has been a slow process bringing them together and developing 
understanding and trust, but once in agreement, the Board members smoothly implement 
the Board's decisions. While Mr. Houlemard predicts that FORA will exist for only six 
more years, FORA's charter goes all the way to 2014. 
Mr. Houlemard categorizes the stakeholders in three levels. The first level 
is comprised of the Cities of Marina and Seaside. The second level is comprised of the 
Cities of Del Rey Oaks and Monterey, Monterey County, UCMBEST, and CSUMB. The 
third level is comprised of the remaining FORA Board members, for whom Fort Ord 
reuse does not directly affect. High and uncertain costs, the plethora of regulatory 
agencies with overlapping authority and jurisdiction, the temporary nature of the FORA 
Board, and a lack of trained deconstruction contractors are the barriers preventing 
resolution of the problem. 73 
g. California Department of Toxic Substances Control 
The California Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) is one of 
73 Michael Houlemard, Executive Director, Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA), 
interview by David Luckey, 31 July 2000, Marina, California. 
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the six components of the California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal EPA).74 
DTSC's mission "is to protect public health and the environment from harmful exposure 
to hazardous substances, without unnecessarily impacting sustainable growth and 
development... [by] regulating hazardous waste facilities and overseeing the cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites in California."75 DTSC's primary concern in the present case is the 
proper classification of building materials before disposal in landfills. The potential 
volume of demolition debris is extensive. On one hand, if waste generators over-classify 
the waste as hazardous, then there is a chance that the debris from Fort Ord could 
overwhelm California's capacity to dispose of it. On the other hand, if waste generators 
under classify the waste, then there is a risk that improper disposal would harm the public 
health or the environment. 76 
h. California Integrated Waste Management Board 
The California Integrated Waste Management Board (CIWMB) is another 
one of the six components of Cal EPA. The Board "is responsible for protecting the 
public's health and safety and the environment through management of the estimated 60 
74 The California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal EPA) is an umbrella 
organization with six components: the Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC), 
the California Integrated Waste Management Board (CIWMB), the Air Resources Board 
(ARB), the Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR), the Office of Environmental 
Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA), and the State Water Resources Control Board 
(SWRCB). For more information, see the Cal EPA website at 
<http://www.calepa.ca.gov/>. 
75 California Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Toxic Substances 
Control, About DTSC, available [Online] <http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/about/> [ 4 April 
2001]. 
76 Chris Marxen, California Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC), 
interview with the authors, 21 August 2000. Interview questions were emailed to Mr. 
Marxen, and he wrote his responses into the file and emailed them back to the authors. 
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million tons of solid waste generated in California."77 As part of that responsibility, the 
Board's primary objective is to reduce the volume of waste sent to landfills. To achieve 
that objective, the Board is very proactive in recycling efforts, and they are the agency 
responsible for enforcing California Code AB939. We address the impact of AB939 on 
the building removal case in the Changing Constraints section of this chapter. 78 
i. California Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
The California Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Cal 
OSHA) is the largest division within the Department of Industrial Relations. OSHA has 
two responsibilities: enforcing "California laws and regulations pertaining to workplace 
safety and health," and providing training assistance "to employers and workers about 
workplace safety and health issues."79 The consultation branch utilizes only one tenth of 
the personnel and funding of the enforcement branch. The enforcement branch responds 
to complaints from employees, whereas the consultation branch responds to requests for 
assistance from employers. OSHA's interest in the present case is the safety of workers 
who would remediate or remove the buildings. The contractors must ensure safety 
programs are in place to protect their workers, and that workers who handle hazardous 
77 California Integrated Waste Management Board, California Integrated Waste 
Management Board, 2001, available [Online] <http://www.ciwmb.ca.gov/> [4 April 
2001]. 
78 John Blue and Terry Brennan, California Integrated Waste Management Board 
(CIWMB), interview by the authors, 2 March 2001, Sacramento, California. 
79 California Department of Industrial Relations. Division of Occupational Safety 
and Health, About Us, May 2000, available [Online] 
<http://www.dir.ca.gov/DOSH/aboutus.htm> [4 April 2001]. 
46 
materials or operate machinery receive adequate 'training and certification, and have 
avenues to raise safety concerns to the management. 80 
j. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) "was created to permit 
coordinated and effective governmental action on behalf of the environment," and 
"endeavors to abate and control pollution systematically, by proper integration of a 
variety of research, monitoring, standard setting, and enforcement activities.... In all, 
EPA is designed to serve as the public's advocate for a livable environment."81 The 
EPA's mission "is to protect human health and to safeguard the natural environment-
air, water, and land-upon which life depends."82 The jurisdiction of EPA Region 9 
covers the states of California, Nevada, Arizona, and Hawaii. 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), established the Superfund in 1980. The EPA uses money from 
the Superfund to pay for cleanup of facilities on the National Priority List such as Fort 
Ord. Additionally, the EPA and the Department of Defense have a Memorandum of 
Agreement (MOA) to provide EPA funding of approximately $150,000 from BRAC in 
return for EPA's oversight of cleanup at military facilities. However, Superfund only 
finances the cleanup of hazardous materials already released to the environment. Since 
80 Scott McAllister, California Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA), interview by the authors, 1March2001, Oakland, California. 
81 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Agency Overview, 26 March 2001, 
available [Online] <http://www.epa.gov/history/org/origins/overview.htm> [4 April 
2001]. 
82 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Agency Mission Statement, 19 
September 2000. Available [Online] 
<http://www.epa.gov/history/ org/ origins/mission.htm> [ 4 April 2001]. 
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the hazardous materials are contained on and within the buildings, it is not applicable to 
the removal or remediation of buildings. The EPA argues that LBP that peels and falls 
off the buildings qualifies as a release to the environment under CERCLA, but the Army 
does not agree. This issue has not yet been resolved. 
The EPA' s primary concern in the present case is the intended use of the 
land. EPA must write a Finding of Suitability to Transfer (FOST) before the Army 
transfers land to the local community. The FOST is a statement by the EPA that the 
property is safe for its intended reuse. The Army must write an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) that evaluates the difference between the present state and desired use of 
the land according to the Base Reuse Plan. If the EPA agrees with the EIS, then they 
issue the FOST. 
Like other regulatory agencies, EPA Region 9 does not have a 
representative on the FORA Board, and they have adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude 
toward Fort Ord reuse. They are proactive in existing or past releases of pollutants to the 
environment, but they are not concerned with potential future releases such as those due 
to building demolition. 83 
k. Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and 
Environment 
Mr. Ray Clark is the highest-level Army Secretary directly involved with 
base closure issues. His philosophy is that the Army should be a "partner in 
development."84 Unfortunately, the armed services are incapable of seeing the problem 
83 Seraydarian interview, 1 March 2001. 
84 Ray Clark, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment, 
interview by the authors, 5 March 2001, Washington, D.C. 
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from the community's perspective. Land development is not an Army core mission, so 
the Army has no expertise in it. The primary problem from his perspective is a lack of 
communication between the local community and the Army, which he says is required at 
the outset of a base closure. He believes in bringing in a developer early to act as a 
bridge between the Army and the community; "the developer understands what the 
community wants and they have the time and a sense of value and can solve the 
communication problem."85 
1. Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Environment, Safety, 
& Occupational Health 
Mr. Ray Fatz reports directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Installations, and he responds to crises that come to the attention of the administration or 
of congressional representatives such as Sam Farr. Fort Ord is his largest problem. 
There is poor communication at all levels of involvement, and he "can throw lots of 
money at it, but that won't solve the problem."86 The Army has a great deal of technical 
expertise at its disposal, but has no sense as a developer. While the local reuse authority 
is responsible for development, neither the Army nor FORA has the proper skill sets to 
provide for economic development. The Army and FORA Board must have a common 
definition of success and work together to achieve it, and to achieve resolution as quickly 
as possible, FORA must be involved early in the process. To solve the current stalemate, 
developers need to be included in the decision making process. 
8S Ibid. 
86 Ray Fatz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Environment, Safety, 
and Occupational Health, interview with the authors, 5 March 2001, Washington, D.C. 
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"We didn't handle things right from the beginning, but some of that is due 
to the BRAC legislation. The BRAC legislation didn't allow us to do it right."87 Base 
closure has been unsuccessful because the law establishing BRAC did not include a 
strategy to ensure a successful completion; DoD must establish new rules for the BRAC 
process. BRAC did not have a good start and this deficiency has resulted in the current 
stalemate at Fort Ord. 
Mr. Patz realizes that information tends to get filtered as it works its way 
up the chain of command, so he has personally gone to Fort Ord and held "sensing 
sessions" to hear directly from the stakeholders. After the second sensing session, Mr. 
Patz started the Strategic Management, Analysis, Requirements, and Technology 
(SMART) Team to continue an open forum for sharing ideas and finding common 
ground. The SMART Team held its first meeting in August of 1999, and it continues to 
meet on a monthly basis. 88 
m. Department of the Army, Base Realignment and Closure Office 
Falling directly under the Army Chief of Staff, the Base Realignment and 
Closure Office (BRACO) is responsible for all Army base closure issues. Established ten 
years ago, BRACO has worked on every BRAC round. BRACO works with the civilian 
side of the Army, the Army Secretariat, in designing and implementing both overall 
policy and detailed issues regarding all of the Army's closed bases. The primary 
responsibility of BRACO is the clean up and transfer of Army property to local 




safety, and environmental issues. BRACO interfaces with many organizations both 
within and outside of the Army, such as federal and state level EPA, the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, and the Army Environmental Policy Institute. The standard they use 
is "clean up to like reuse. If the Army were to keep the property, what would we do?"89 
The Army used the buildings aboard the former Fort Ord and if the base remained open, 
they would still be using the buildings. The Army has strict guidelines for clean up and 
follows all environmental regulations, however, "the line they will not cross is fiscal 
benefit to the recipient."90 
n. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) handles various 
issues such as specific base program management and integration, transfer of property 
and land, real estate issues, environmental concerns, water rights, and housing. 
TRADOC acts as a liaison between the Army BRACO and local reuse authorities such as 
FORA. Complete environmental remediation is primarily TRADOC's responsibility, 
however, the Army-like the U.S. EPA-does not consider buildings as part of the 
environment. TRADOC was ready to give land in 1993-94, but FORA was not ready to 
receive it. Property is the common ground, "they want it, and we want to get rid of it. 
What is needed is consensus and community agreement."91 
89 Colonel Stephen Shambach and Lieutenant Colonel Edgar Yangar, U.S. Army 
Base Realignment and Closure Office (BRACO), interview by the authors, 6 March 
2001, Washington, D.C. 
90 Ibid. 
91 David Taylor and Judy Johnston, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC), interview by David Luckey, 27 February 2001, by telephone. 
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o. U.S. Representative Sam Farr, California J 1h District 
Congressman Farr sees himself as a mediator, and he has been very 
proactive in bringing stakeholders together to search for common ground. He has 
initiated summits to resolve issues between the U.S. Army, EPA Region 9, DTSC, and 
FORA. Congressman Farr serves on the House Committee on Appropriations and the 
House Subcommittee on Military Construction, and he obtained the open-ended 
appropriation in the FY2001 MILCON bill to build the thermo-chemical conversion plant 
at Fort Ord. He believes that the developers will not take the land "for free" because of 
the liability issues of toxic and hazardous materials. As the 17th District Representative, 
Congressman Farr is very knowledgeable about and actively involved in the issues at the 
former Fort Ord.92 
p. Office of U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein 
This office is a stakeholder from two perspectives. First, the Senator has a 
stake because Fort Ord lies within her state. In the case of Fort Ord, Michael Schiffer 
stated, "We must build consensus among the stakeholders ... meet satisfaction of all the 
stakeholders ... sit down with all individuals and groups with interests, within scheduling 
constraints... [and] listen to differing opinions and look for middle ground. "93 However, 
he provided no specific information as to how to accomplish this. Although the intent of 
92 U.S. Representative Sam Farr, 1 ?1h District, California, and Rochelle Dornatt, 
Administrative Assistant to Representative Farr, interview by the authors, 8 March 2001, 
Washington, D.C. 
93 R. Michael Schiffer, Legislative Assistant to U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein of 
California, interview by the authors, 8 March 2001, Washington, D.C. 
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her office is to play a constructive role in the Fort Ord problem, Schiffer had neither 
comment regarding what that problem might be nor any potential solutions. 
Second, Senator Feinstein has input into the BRAC legislation in the 
Senate. From her perspective, there is a larger BRAC issue as "BRAC hit California too 
hard."94 However, once again, there was "no thought regarding amendments to [future] 
McCain legislation,"95 because they want to wait until Defense Secretary Rumsfeld 
publishes the results of his review of the military. Additionally, "we need a clear idea as 
to what the majority wants; we have no defined positions yet; we may or may not choose 
to go with the majority wants depending on what that is."96 
q. Office of U.S. Senator John McCain 
The President, the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
agree that more base closures are necessary to reduce the military's infrastructure and 
make additional funds available for operations, maintenance, and procurement of 
equipment. Senator McCain has recently proposed legislation to conduct two additional 
BRAC rounds in 2003 and 2005. The proposed legislation is identical to the 1991 BRAC 
legislation. "The purpose of our legislation is not which bases or how to do the process, 
but simply to order one or two more rounds. It will be up to BRAC to decide on the 
process and utilize lessons leamed"97 from previous base closures. One should consider 




97 Lieutenant Commander Dell Bull, USN, Legislative Fellow, Office of Senator 
John McCain, interview by the authors, 9 March 2001, Washington, D.C. 
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3. Changing Constraints 
a. Personnel Turnover 
When people within a bureaucracy get promoted or retire, or when voters 
put a new government official into office, that person takes with them not only the 
knowledge and experience from their job, but also the relationships and trust they have 
developed with others in the community. 
In fact, the differences in structure between the U.S. Anny and the 
local community are a source of potential conflict. The Anny has 
traditionally organized itself to move personnel every two years to new 
venues and assignments. This systematic rotation of staff makes it 
difficult to establish a sense of continuity, and a feeling of trust. At crucial 
times working relationships with local decision makers were disrupted just 
when they had gotten started, as new people were assigned. 98 
The Anny recognized that a situation like base closure needed continuity, so they 
instituted a policy of allowing personnel to serve a "twilight" tour for six years before 
their retirement in one location. This policy worked well for the first six years, but then 
made matters worse by allowing six years worth of knowledge and experience walk out 
the door. 
The problem is not limited to the military. For example, Fred Harris worked as a 
community contract specialist for FORA for many years. When he retired, he left behind 
many files of information, but it is extremely difficult for anyone who was not involved 
in creating the files to know what is in them, how they are organized, and what the 
lessons learned were. In another example, the founding chair of the FORA-funded 
Coordinated Resource Management Planning (CRMP) group was the local head of the 
98 Cavanaugh, 46-4 7. 
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Bureau of Land Management (BLM). When he transferred, it left a leadership vacuum in 
CRMP until a University of California Santa Cruz professor agreed to take the founding 
chairs' place sometime after he left. A new person taking over a job without a turnover 
starts anew, and even when there is an overlap for personnel, some level of knowledge 
and experience is lost in the process. 
There have been multiple turnovers in elected offices since the closure of Fort 
Ord. For example, there have been three mayors of the City of Seaside in the past 
decade. It is important to realize that in addition to elected officials leaving office, the 
demographics of the population also change over time. Within a community, the pro-
growth, no-growth, and limited growth groups shift considerably. While most residents 
of the City of Marina supported growth into the former Fort Ord at the beginning of the 
process, in the last election a majority of the residents voted in favor of Measure E, 
limiting the city's growth over the next twenty years. 99 
b. Funding 
The federal government plans budgets at least a year in advance, and the 
military programs their budget money for several years in advance. Due to the strict 
regimen of the federal fiscal year, federal activities lose any unused funds on the first day 
of October. It does not matter ifthe task is incomplete. With this long-term program and 
budget culture of the military, BRAC was set up with a step-down decreasing budget 
over a period of several years, so regardless whether or not the base closures are 
complete, at some point the funding stops. This long-term budget system can also make 
99 Endsley and Cook interview. 
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it difficult to negotiate contracts with civilian developers who work on a short-term basis 
and cannot wait for the allocation of money in next year's budget for them to conduct a 
job this year. 
While each of the voting FORA Board members pays FORA $14,000 per 
year to cover administrative costs, most of the funds that FORA handles come from 
grants. I oo This poses a couple of problems. First, the grant is for a specific amount of 
money, so it does not matter ifthe project is not complete; when the money runs out-the 
project ends. Second, the grant is for a specific length of time and requires renewal on a 
periodic basis. If a competing project wins the grant, then at the end of the grant period 
the sponsor withdraws the current project's funding. FORA has had multiple projects 
begin with funding from grants, only to be stopped before completion because the grant 
ran out of money or time and was not renewed. 
The military construction (MILCON) bill for fiscal year 2001 included an 
open-ended appropriation to build a new thermo-chemical conversion plant at Fort Ord to 
transform hazardous material into non-hazardous waste. However, funding does not exist 
to begin removal of the buildings. Future land sales may provide the funds to continue 
the operation once it starts, but thus far, no one will provide funds to start it. No one will 
100 Ivana Bednarik, Fort Ord Reuse Authority, response to interview questions by 
e-mail, 19 April 2001. Currently, each of the 13 voting members pays $14,000 for a total 
of $182,000 per year, and the six ex-officio members each pay $7,000 for a total of 
$42,000 per year. That adds up to $224,000 in annual membership dues. Otherwise, 
FORA operates on federal & state grants, such as a $30 million grant from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Economic Development Authority (EDA) for a Capital 
Improvement Program that expires in FY 2003; and a $4.4 million grant from the 
Department of Defense, Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) and the EDA for 
planning/operations that expires in FY 2001. 
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provide the initial funding for two reasons. First, the financial stakes are high. It cost 
roughly $400,000 to identify salvageable materials in some of the buildings thus far. A 
David and Lucile Packard Foundation grant paid for half of that cost. The total estimated 
cost for completely removing all the buildings is $60,000,000. Second, it is difficult to 
reliably estimate how much the entire project will cost. For example, a small group of 
buildings that belong to CSUMB incurred asbestos removal costs five times greater than 
originally estimated. 
Selling the land to fund building removal seems wise on the surface, but it 
requires closer examination. For example, FORA and the City of Marina use different 
criteria to appraise the land. Marina bases property values on current property values 
within the City of Marina. FORA bases estimates on local coastal property, which are 
much higher. Additionally, there is the lack of common terminology amongst the 
stakeholders. In the interviews conducted for this thesis, stakeholders provided resource 
and budgeting statistics in several different units of measurement, such as the U.S. 
Dollar, Full Time Equivalent (FTE), and the Personnel Year. 
c. AB939 
One California state law, in particular, will affect the disposition of 
materials from the buildings if they are demolished and sent to landfills. Based on 
California Code AB939 and beginning this year, California cities face a $10,000 fine per 
day if they have not reduced their 1990 waste stream to the landfill by fifty percent. If a 
demolished building is on land that a city is to receive, the material from that building 
will count toward that city's input to the landfill. If, however, CIWMB waived AB939 in 
57 
the case of Fort Ord, then it would lift the risk of adverse financial impact on the local 
municipalities, and they would be far more likely to participate in building removal. 
d. Training 
Some local organizations perceive building removal as both an 
opportunity to provide practical experience and training for local citizens in 
deconstruction and hazardous material abatement, and as a source of jobs for local 
construction workers and carpenters. These are reasonable ends, but restricting who and 
how to conduct removal operations makes estimating the cost more difficult and 
ultimately, more costly. The reason is simple. To exploit the training opportunity, local 
workers need federally mandated training to work with hazardous materials, and, thus far, 
no one has committed the funding for that training. It might cost less to hire contractors 
who already have the required training and experience. If FORA elected to create jobs 
for local construction workers and carpenters, it may forfeit its option to choose the least 
expensive contractor for the job. 
e. Environmental Regulations 
There are a host of environmental laws, regulations, and ordinances 
associated with building removal imposed at the federal, state, and regional levels. For 
example, the Monterey County Health Department, MBUAPCD, CCRWQCB, and the 
California DTSC are four of the agencies in the state responsible for regulating hazardous 
waste. Given that Anny property is involved, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also has 
some responsibility and oversight. These overlapping jurisdictions have lead to conflicts 
over precedence of regulations. 
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While there are many agencies with overlapping jurisdiction, even 
application of the waste classification codes and regulations of just one agency have 
proven inconsistent. For example, DTSC's Regulation Guidance Document #33 
regarding lead based paint, construction debris, and the disposition of it has produced 
conflicting interpretations. The California Department of Health Services (DHS) was 
conducting a campaign to reduce childhood lead poisoning by cleaning up LBP in 
residential areas. To support the efforts of DHS, DTSC issued Regulation Guidance 
Document #33 which stated that as long as LBP adhered to wood, then it would probably 
not cause a hazardous release to the waste stream. DHS and the construction and 
demolition industries interpreted the guidance as carte blanche to throw away any wood 
painted with LBP, and the waste management district interpreted the guidance to mean 
that they could accept wood painted with LBP. However, that was not the DTSC's 
intent. DTSC emphasized that the guidance did not change the regulations, and that it 
was still the responsibility of the waste-generator to determine if the waste resulted in a 
toxic emission to the environment. 
Asbestos and lead-based paint are the two main environmental concerns 
associated with building removal. While the costs involved in handling and disposing 
asbestos are considerable, the regulations are well defined and understood by industry. 
LBP is a much more complicated issue. National, state, and local regulatory agencies 
have many different regulations on LBP abatement. The Center for Disease Control has 
established a blood concentration limit of 10 µg/dL. However, establishing a limit for a 
given waste stream (airborne, water, soil) is extremely difficult because it requires the use 
of theories, assumptions, and estimates to quantify the methods of transport. It is also 
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difficult because there are multiple paths from the air, soil, and water. Simply 
establishing a regulatory limit on airborne lead will not prevent the cumulative effects 
from the soil, water, and air from causing the blood concentration levels to exceed the 
CDC limit of 10 µg/dL. 
4. No Definitive Solution 
With no common definition of a problem among a large and diverse set of 
stakeholders, there is little to bound the problem solving process. Stakeholders generally 
offer solutions only to their own problems without regard to the interests of others. The 
proliferation of solutions can and has caused deadlock where each stakeholder competes 
with others for acceptance of his or her ideas. On one hand, the Anny has said the land is 
free for the taking, but the land comes with the buildings intact. On the other hand, the 
local community has said it will not accept the land with the buildings, and the Anny 
must remove them. This has resulted in a stalemate causing once-usable buildings to fall 
into disrepair. The next chapter illustrates the challenges of finding a strategy for coping 
with this wicked problem at Fort Ord. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Building removal at Fort Ord is a wicked problem. There is no agreement on the 
problem concerning Fort Ord building removal among a very large and diverse set of 
stakeholders at the local, state, and federal levels. Resource constraints such as personnel 
with experience and project funding from grants have varied in the past decade and 
multiple agencies interpret and apply the various laws and regulations differently. 
60 
Moreover, the situation has produced no solution that is acceptable to all, or even a 
majority of stakeholders. 
There is an old saw about a man meeting another man under a lamp on a city 
street. The man under the lamp was obviously looking for something, so the second man, 
wanting to help, asked, "What are you looking for?" The first man replied, "My keys." 
Whereupon, the second man asked, "Did you lose them around here?" To this, the first 
man replied, "No, I lost them in that alley across the street." Causing the second man to 
ask incredulously, "Then why are you looking for them here?" The first man responded 
indignantly, "Because this is where the light is." This story reminds us of each 
stakeholder looking for his or her desired outcome under the light cast by his or her own 
particular agenda. 
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IV. COPING WITH A WICKED PROBLEM: FORT ORD 
BUILDING REMOVAL 
The closure of Fort Ord has gradually progressed over a ten-year period marked by ... 
several continuing problems. 
Joe Cavanaugh 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter III used the building removal issue at the former Fort Ord to illustrate 
what a wicked problem looks like in practice, especially in a military context. This 
chapter focuses on coping strategies and illustrates their applicability in the Fort Ord 
case. We begin by examining the outcomes of previous reuse planning efforts, and we 
end by recommending actions to resolve the base closure problems. 
B. PREVIOUS STRATEGY ATTEMPTS 
There have been several attempts at planning for Fort Ord base reuse over the past 
eight years. Some of the previous attempts seemed to achieve positive results, but none 
of them has succeeded in overcoming the deadlock on building removal. 
1. Fort Ord Community Task Force 
When the Secretary of Defense announced the proposed closure of Fort Ord in 
January 1990, then U.S. Representative Leon Panetta created the Fort Ord Community 
Task Force to "assist in evaluating the probable impact on Monterey County."101 In 
March 1990, the Task Force issued its initial report recommending against the closure of 
Fort Ord. "The report concluded that the closure of Fort Ord did not serve the best 
IO 1 Cavanaugh, 9. 
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interests of national defense and could cause severe economic consequences for the 
region."102 Tension arose between the Task Force and the Army Corps of Engineers 
because the Army began preparation of an EIS in 1990, before Congress decided to close 
the base. 
Because community leaders opposed the closing of Ft. Ord, they also 
opposed work on the E.I.S. As a result of opposition from the Task Force, 
Congressman Panetta and other community leaders, work on the E.I.S. 
was limited to collection of base line data that could be used to continue to 
operate the base, realign missions, or to close the base. I 03 
After the Department of Defense announced its decision to close Fort Ord in 1991, the 
Task Force shifted its focus to base reuse. Meanwhile, the Army Corps of Engineers 
resumed preparation of the EIS in March 1992, under much Congressional pressure. 
Leon Panetta added a rider to a congressional bill directing the Corps of Engineers to 
complete the EIS in 18 months-a task that normally takes two and a half to three years 
to complete. Additionally, it was to have a broader scope than a typical EIS, because it 
had to address "social and economic impacts as well as environmental impacts."104 
The Task Force continued its efforts within the local community, ultimately 
holding hundreds of meetings by seven advisory groups. Over 400 local community 
leaders participated in these efforts, and the Task Force published its several hundred-
102 Ibid. 
103 Civic Practice Network, Case Study #3: The Fort Ord Reuse Case, available 
[Online] <http://www.cpn.org/ cpn/ sections/topics/ environment/ stories-
studies/armycorps _ langton4c.html> [10 April 2001], page 3of13. 
104 Ibid. 
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page Fort Ord Task Force Strategy Report in June of 1992. 105 
[The report] formed the basis for Secretary of Defense William Perry to 
designate Fort Ord as a National Model for Base Conversion Programs in 
1993. A valuable feature of having the seven Advisory Groups meeting as 
part of a larger Task Force was the sharing of information and objectives 
that occurred as a result of the consensus-based approach that was used 
during this process. I 06 
The Task Force's limited objectives were to "prepare its development strategy 
through the May-June 1992 time-frame," and, "thereafter, the Task Force would 
complete its work and serve in an advisory role to the County [of Monterey] and the two 
Cities [of Seaside and Marina] through November, 1992."107 The Task Force never 
followed through on the implementation of its Strategy Report. Instead, it quietly 
abdicated its planning role as the cities of Marina and Seaside took over base reuse 
planning. 
2. Fort Ord Economic Development Authority 
After the official decision to close Fort Ord, the cities of Seaside and Marina 
formed the Fort Ord Economic Development Authority (FOEDA) to begin base reuse 
planning. "The 'focal point responsibility to DOD' would transition in July 1992 from 
the Task Force to those jurisdictions with municipal services and local land use zoning 
105 We have found references both to the Fort Ord Community Task Force and to 
the Fort Ord Task Force, and it is not certain if the name was changed or if it was 
abbreviated for simplicity. While we have not obtained a copy of the Task Force 
Strategy Report, we have found it cited as both a 300-page document and a 760-page 
document. 
l06 Cavanaugh, 10. 
107 Fort Ord Economic Development Authority, An Initial Reuse Plan for Fort 
Ord: An Immediate Challenge for Those Interested in Economic Recovery (Fort Ord 
Economic Development Authority, 10 July 1992), 2. 
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responsibilities (i.e., Monterey County, the City of Marina, and the City of Seaside)."108 
From the limited records of FOEDA's existence, our assessment is that FOEDA was a 
short-lived and poorly directed effort.109 Eventually, the Cities of Del Rey Oaks, 
Monterey, and Sand City discovered they would also receive property from the former 
Fort Ord. The Fort Ord Reuse Group (FORG) was established to incorporate reuse 
planning by all of the jurisdictions that would receive land from the closed base. 
3. Fort Ord Reuse Group 
"On October 1, 1992, the Cities of Marina, Seaside, Del Rey Oaks, Sand City, 
Monterey and Monterey County opened the offices of the Fort Ord Reuse Group 
(FORG). FORG was organized by local governments to begin the next step in planning 
based on the Strategy Report [of the Task Force]."110 However, FORG's relationships 
with other cities in the community were adversarial. Cities within Monterey County that 
were not included in FORG, such as Carmel, Pacific Grove, and Salinas expressed 
concern that FORG would overdevelop the area, and that it would have an adverse 
impact on them through effects such as reduced revenue and increased automobile traffic 
108 Ibid. 
109 Will Koon, Directorate of Base Realignment and Closure, and Gail 
Youngblood, Directorate of Environmental and Natural Resources, Presidio of Monterey, 
interview with the authors, 12 April 2001, Marina, California. FOEDA made a 
presentation to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Mr. Paul W. Johnson, on 20 
November 1992. An Army evaluation of the presentation stated the "proposal [was] of 
poor quality," and did not formally address five issues identified by the Secretary. Mr. 
Koon provided copies of the FOEDA presentation slides and of the Army secretariat's 
appraisal of the presentation. The latter included that the FOEDA proposal was "not 
logically developed," its assumptions were not explicit, that "rationale was confusing or 
absent," it provided "no supporting data for estimated cost and savings," and it did not 
provide "examples of similar proposals." 
110 Fort Ord Reuse Group, Preliminary Draft Initial Base Reuse Plan (Marina: 
Fort Ord Reuse Group, 17 December 1992), 5. 
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and air pollution. FORG called for an ambitious, high-density plan "to develop 65% of 
the undeveloped land for a buildout population of 250,000."111 
Like the Task Force, FORG also had an adversarial relationship with the Anny 
Corps of Engineers.112 While the Anny Corps of Engineers prepared the EIS, FORG 
prepared the Base Reuse Plan. Although Corps and FORG representatives met biweekly, 
the Anny and FORG developed their respective plans without regard to each other. 
Idealistically, the community develops a base reuse plan that describes the desired end-
state of the base, and the Anny prepares an EIS that compares the current state of the land 
with the desired end-state in the reuse plan and estimates the impact on the environment 
as a result of that conversion. In this case, the Army was concerned with completing the 
EIS before the deadline established by Congress. The Corps of Engineers began 
preparing the EIS in earnest in April of 1992-two months before the Task Force 
published its report, and then released an initial draft of the EIS in December of 1992-
three months before FORG published its Initial Base Reuse Plan. 
FORG submitted its Initial Base Reuse Plan to the Anny on 24 March 1993. 
[The Anny] determined that the E.I.S. already had a very wide range of 
alternatives, and the FORG plan could not be implemented, because it did 
not reflect the request from federal and local agencies for land, and 
because of the significant impacts resulting from the extensive 
111 Civic Practice Network, 6 of 13. The Anny's EIS included six alternative 
plans and three sub-alternatives, and the plan preferred by the Anny called for 
"developing approximately 14% of the undeveloped land and a corresponding buildout 
population of about 22,800." This preferred plan would have roughly restored the 
population of the community to the level when the base was active. 
112 Leon Panetta, U.S. Representative, to Paul Johnson, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Anny, Installations and Logistics, 18 December 1992. From the files of 
the Presidio of Monterey, Directorate of Base Realignment and Closure, Marina, 
California. 
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development proposed in the FORG initial plan. The Army decided not to 
attempt to integrate or reconcile it with the E.l.S., because it would slow 
down the process.113 
Federal law requires the Army to convey land to four different categories of recipients 
before they can offer it to the local community. First priority goes to any federal agency 
that requests it. This is how the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DF AS) 
obtained the hospital building. Second priority goes to state agencies, such as the 
California State University and University of California. Third priority goes to nonprofit 
service agencies, such as homeless service providers. Fourth priority goes to PBCs. For 
example, the local school district received the schools on base under a PBC. After those 
four recipients have had an opportunity to claim property, the remainder is open for 
conveyance to the local community.114 Because the FORG Initial Base Reuse Plan did 
not account for land requests by agencies in these four categories, and because the FORG 
plan called for a high-density level of development, "a report was prepared for the Army 
by the Corps in April 1993, concluding that the FORG Reuse Plan was unworkable."115 
4. Fort Ord Reuse Authority 
The concerns raised by cities not included in FORG got the attention of California 
State Senator Henry Mello. To ensure that planning for Fort Ord Reuse considered the 
broad impact on the region and not just on the cities adjacent to Fort Ord, the California 
State Senate created the Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA) in April 1994, to prepare, 
113 Civic Practice Network, 5of13. 
114 Ila Mettee-McCutchon, former Commandant of the Defense Language 
Institute, Garrison Commander and Installation Commander for the Presidio of Monterey, 
interview by the authors, 11 April, 2001, Sand City, California. 
115 Civic Practice Network, 5of13. 
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adopt, finance, and implement a base reuse plan.116 The 13-member FORA Board 
consists of the members of its FORG predecessor plus additional representatives from the 
cities of Carmel-by-the-Sea, Pacific Grove, and Salinas.117 Additionally, there are non-
voting members on the Board, such as the Executive Director of the local reuse authority 
and the Army Installation Commander. FORA completed an updated Fort Ord Base 
Reuse Plan in June 1997_118 
FORA has improved on the previous reuse planning efforts by FORG in three 
ways. First, FORA has legitimacy in the fact that the Army recognizes it as the Local 
Reuse Authority (LRA). Federal law requires the establishment of an LRA to receive 
conveyance of property from the Army. Second, it has improved legitimacy because it 
has included more of the stakeholder cities in the region. Third, it has funding from the 
members of the Board and from fees assessed on transferred properties. For example, the 
Board members pay FORA $224,000 annually toward its operational and administrative 
costs, 119 and FORA receives $1 million per year in fees from the rent of the housing units 
in Preston Park that were transferred to the City of Marina. This is not to say that the 
Army would not have recognized FORG as the LRA, or that FORG could not have raised 
116 Endsley and Cook interview. 
11 7 The cities of Seaside and Marina each have two voting members on the FORA 
Board and the County of Monterey has three. 
118 FORA submitted its Base Reuse Plan, "18 months late, in draft form, and 
without a business plan." Mettee-McCutchon interview. For more information, see the 
FORA and the Former Fort Ord Environmental Cleanup websites, available [Online] 
<http://www.fora.org> and <http://www.fortordcleanup.com/reuseplanning.shtml> [ 14 
April 2001]. 
119 Bednarik interview. 
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such funds to support their efforts. It is merely an observation of some of the differences 
between the two organizations. 
5. Restoration Advisory Board 
When the Department of Defense began environmental cleanup of military bases 
in the 1970s, it became apparent that the traditional decision making method of "Decide, 
Announce, Defend,"120 was no longer suitable in dealing with the public. 
Citizens, typically, have not felt that they can really affect the course of 
things, that opportunities provided them for comment and 'participation' 
are little more than window-dressing, belated attempts to secure their 
consent to decisions others have already made. New ways to bring 
stakeholders into the process had to be found. 121 
In an effort to keep the public informed and involved in environmental restoration 
projects at military bases, the Department of Defense decided to create a Restoration 
Advisory Board (RAB) "at closing and realigning bases where property will be available 
for transfer to the community .... Through the RAB, stakeholders may review progress 
and provide input to the decision making process."122 It is important to note that the 
Army establishes RABs not only at closing or closed bases, but also at active bases where 
the local community is concerned with environmental cleanup at the base. 
120 Fatz interview and Andrew Szasz and Michael Meuser, Stakeholder 
Participation in the Toxic Cleanup of Military Facilities and its Relationship to the 
Prospects for Economic Reuse: The Case of Fort Ord, California, 30 March 1995, 
available [Online] <http://www.mapcruzin.com/fotp/eda.htm> [10 April 2001], 4 of22. 
121 Szasz and Meuser, 4-5 of22. 
122 U.S. Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, DOD Guidance on 
Improving Public Involvement in Environmental Cleanup at Closing Bases, 18 May 
1996, available [Online] <http://www.dtic.mil/envirodod/brac/public.html> [14 April 
2001]. 
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6. Strategic Management, Analysis, Requirements, and Technology 
Team 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the SMART Team grew out of one of 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Mr. Fatz's "sensing sessions" with stakeholders 
at Fort Ord. While the SMART is oriented toward resolving unexploded ordinance issues 
and not building removal, we believe it is an important example to present because it 
brought together executive government and both federal and state level regulatory 
agencies. The Department of the Army, U.S. EPA Region 9, California DTSC, U.S. 
Army TRADOC, and the local installation commander all participate in the SMART 
Team, and the Team's meetings allowed for some public commentary. 
C. RESULTS OF PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS 
In the following subsections of this chapter, we examine the previous attempts at 
Fort Ord reuse planning. We use Roberts' three-strategy framework to categorize the 
previous attempts, and we seek to understand the extent stakeholders used authoritative, 
competitive, and collaborative strategies in their dealings with one another. Examples of 
each strategy are illustrated and the results summarized. 
1. Authoritative 
a. Indications 
There are three indications of an authoritative strategy. First, there must 
be an entity that is acknowledged to have the right, by virtue of its position, knowledge, 
or power, to make decisions and take action that it deems appropriate and necessary. 
Second, stakeholders are expected to comply with the entity's decisions and actions in 
deference to the position, knowledge, or power that it holds. And third, stakeholders face 
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serious repercussions for their refusal to comply with the entity's decision and actions. 
Thus, there is an element of coercion in the authoritative strategy. 
b. Example 
In the current Defense Department environment of declining resources and 
fiscal constraints, the government has the authority, in principle, to cancel efforts that do 
not produce positive results. The Army attempted to exercise this authority when it took 
action to disband the RAB. Based on its review of the millions of dollars and countless 
man-hours expended in support of the RAB, the Anny concluded that little of substance 
was being accomplished.123 Tense debates and hot tempers disrupted the meetings. 
Certain vocal individuals from the community attempted to monopolize the agenda and 
discussion. A number of RAB members even stopped attending, having concluded that 
they were getting little benefit from their participation. The Anny believed its usefulness 
had ended and decided to disband the RAB in May of 1999. 
c. Results 
The decision provoked an outcry from some stakeholders. They believed 
"the RAB served as an important and effective forum for public education,"124 and they 
challenged the Anny's authority to disband the RAB without consultation with its 
members. They countered with a lawsuit to stop the effort charging that: 
The Anny did not seek, nor did it receive, the general agreement of 
the RAB membership before disbanding the RAB. Additionally, the 
123 The Anny hired a consultant, Mr. Lenny Segal, to evaluate the RAB, and he 
determined that the RAB was "dysfunctional." Fatz interview. 
124 Scott J. Allen, "Monterey Bay Residents File Notice of Intent to Sue US Anny 
over Former Fort Ord Anny Base Cleanup, Monterey County, California," Fort Ord RAB 
Lawsuit Press Release, 7 August 2000. 
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Army's decision to disband the RAB was not made in consultation with 
the community as a whole .... The Army's discontinuation of the Fort Ord 
RAB is a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. The law 
provides a place in the process for impacted communities and individuals 
to speak their minds and attempt to influence the outcome of cleanup 
decision-making.125 
This lawsuit immediately followed another lawsuit in early 1998 by the 
Fort Ord Toxics Project and several community members of the RAB. They had alleged 
that "the Army was in violation of CERCLA because it (the Army) had failed to perform 
a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study ('RI/FS') to address the serious dangers posed 
by unexploded ordnance on Fort Ord."126 When United States District Court Judge 
Jeremy Fogel indicated he would rule for the plaintiff in the RAB case, the Army then 




There are two indications of a competitive strategy. First, stakeholders 
characterize issues as a zero-sum game: "If I win, then you lose. If you win, then I lose. 
Our interests are considered mutually exclusive." Interactions are therefore marked by 
debates and contests. Second, there is neither an attempt to hold a dialogue and learn 
from one another, nor do the parties entertain different perspectives or points of view. 
Why should one listen to others when the point is to defeat them? Ultimately, the pursuit 
of self-interests over collective interests characterizes their interpersonal relations. Each 
125 Allen Press Release. 
126 Allen Press Release. 
73 
side wants to exercise power over the other to achieve their respective goals. One side 
wins a zero-sum game to the extent that it has a stronger power base than its competitors 
and it uses that power to blunt resistance from the other party as it attains its desired end. 
b. ~xanrple 
FORG, the Army Corps of Engineers, and FOTF engaged in competition 
over base reuse planning. The base reuse planning was described by participants as "at 
times slow, and frequently confrontational.. .. "127 FORG promoted a plan for high-
density redevelopment of Fort Ord. Its members believed that their communities were 
hurt the most by the closure of Fort Ord and they wanted high-density redevelopment to 
restore their local economy. FOTF, on the other hand, supported low-density 
development. It assumed that the benefits derived by the FORG members in 
redeveloping Fort Ord would necessarily be to the detriment of the surrounding 
community. FOTF also competed with members of the local community. While it 
understood the community's "number one concern [to be] a broad-based desire for 
environmental protection," the Task Force "realized that the long-term benefits created 
by a university could stabilize the local economy and create high quality jobs in the 
future ... [and] identified the number one development opportunity as: 'A four-year 
university campus or university complex."'128 
The U.S. Congress imposed an arbitrary deadline on the Army to complete 
the EIS within eighteen months. The Army's interest was to meet this deadline. Waiting 
for the community to produce a base reuse plan would have been detrimental to the 
127 Cavanaugh, 16. 
128 Ibid., 13. 
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Army's timeline for the EIS submission. Additionally, while the Army Corps of 
Engineers included several options for varying levels of development on Fort Ord in their 
plan, the option they promoted was one of low-density development. The Army assumed 
that higher-density development would mean they would have to pay higher costs in time 
and resources for environmental restoration. 
Thus, each stakeholder pursued its self-interests and made little or no 
attempt to identify collective interests among the Army Corps of Engineers and FORG. 
Each struggled to define the planning process in a way that supported its own interests. 
There was no attempt at dialogue. Despite regular meetings between FORG and the 
Army Corps of Engineers, the EIS and the Initial Base Reuse Plan were incompatible. 
Despite hundreds of meetings with members of the local community, the Task Force's 
Strategy Report did not match the "consensus" of the community. 
c. Results 
FORG and the Anny developed their plans in separate, parallel paths, 
without regard for the each other or the interests of other stakeholders. The Army 
produced the EIS before FORG completed the initial base reuse plan, and the two plans 
ended up being incompatible. Eventually, the California State Senate stepped in to 
impose authority on the region by creating FORA. The competition between FORG, the 
Army Corps of Engineers, FOTF, and the local community extended the base reuse 
planning efforts by several years. FORA published its first attempt at a base reuse plan in 
1994, but the FORA .Board did not approve the final base reuse plan until 1997-three 




There are four indications of a collaborative strategy. First, a 
collaborative strategy includes many stakeholders. The strategy holds that all of the 
stakeholders have the opportunity to participate in the process, if they so choose. Second, 
a collaborative strategy seeks to empower the stakeholders by inviting them to join in the 
decision-making process. Third, a collaborative strategy requires dialogue among the 
stakeholders. To develop a common vision for the end state of the situation, the 
stakeholders must communicate their basic desires and fears about the outcome and their 
assumptions in making arguments for their case. Fourth, a collaborative strategy is 
integrated. This integration refers to the efficiency achieved through combined planning 
and minimization of redundant efforts. The stakeholders must come to the table ready to 
create an integrated plan that includes each of the reports required by various branches of 
government and regulatory agencies. If the community has to write a base reuse plan and 
the Army has to write an Environmental Impact Statement or a Habitat Management 
Plan, then they need to do it together so that both plans will work together in achieving a 
common goal. 
b. Example 
The SMART Team is an example of a collaborative strategy. The Team 
included representatives from multiple levels of the Army chain of command and both 
federal and state level environmental regulatory agencies. It also allowed for public 
participation in its meetings. The participants in the Team were empowered to make 
agreements on behalf of their organizations, and the positive attitude toward the Team 
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portrayed in our interviews reflected the quality of dialogue among the participants. By 
bringing the Army and the regulatory agency representatives in the same room, it has 
fostered integration of their planning efforts. 
c. Results 
Two factors limit the SMART Team's utility as an example of a 
collaborative strategy. First, while it was a step in the right direction to include all of the 
participants that they did, there are still more stakeholders that might disagree with 
agreements made by the Team. In other words, their initial level of inclusion was good, 
but not all the stakeholders were brought into the process. Additionally, a recent change 
in the location of the meetings may reduce public involvement in the meetings. The 
Team initially held its meetings in the Monterey area, and it allowed for public 
participation. However, the Team recently began rotating the location of its meetings to 
the headquarters of each of the participants, such as the EPA Region 9 offices in San 
Francisco and the DTSC offices in Sacramento, so it is not as convenient for the public to 
attend the meetings as it was when they were held in Monterey. Second, the objectives of 
the Team so far have been limited to unexploded ordinance issues. It is still a new effort, 
so it may be too soon to evaluate its outcome. On the surface, it seems that there has 
been dialogue at the meetings and it has fostered trust among the participants. 
D. HYBRID STRATEGY 
Given the less than successful results achieved with the three basic strategies, we 
therefore propose a new strategy for building removal at Fort Ord. It is uncertain, 
whether this strategy would work in the current situation after so many years of conflict, 
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stagnation, and failure. However, if the local community is to accept conveyance and 
reuse the land at the former Fort Ord, then something has to change. We believe this 
strategy could improve the chances of successful base reuse planning if it were 
incorporated at the beginning of the base closure process. 
We propose a hybrid strategy that incorporates elements of two previous 
strategies: a collaborative body and an authority. Federal law requires the establishment 
of an authority to accept the conveyance of property from closed bases, but that does not 
negate the need to involve and empower stakeholders through communication to produce 
an integrated plan. In the hybrid strategy, the collaborative body would be comprised of 
all stakeholders, and the authority would be comprised of fewer stakeholders, but it 
would have the responsibility and the ability to implement decisions. This strategy would 
enable the authority to implement the desires of the community with the guidance and 
consent of the technical experts, because it would include all the stakeholders and 
empower them to make decisions. It would require clear communication through 
dialogue among the stakeholders to identify their core assumptions, establish a common 
foundation of knowledge, and build consensus toward a common vision. The strategy 
fosters integrated planning. Ideally, the collaborative body would reach consensus and 
agree on a course of action, and the authority would immediately implement that course 
of action. However, if the collaborative body were unable to reach consensus, the 
authority would then make a decision based upon the information and alternative 
proposals it received. 
Recognized as the LRA to receive conveyance of land from the federal 
government, the authority has the legal power to make and implement decisions. This 
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provides incentive to the collaborative body to work together toward a common goal. If 
they fail to work together, then they know that the authority would make the decision for 
them, and the decision may or may not be in their best interests. The stakeholders are 
likely to respect and accept the decisions made by the authority, because they would have 
had input into the decision-making process. 
1. Strategy Justification 
a. Ability to Implement 
The stakeholders would have the incentive to involve themselves in the 
process. It would be their choice and their responsibility to participate if they have 
interests in the issue. The stakeholders would have an incentive to make concessions and 
come to an agreement that satisfies all participants. Either they build consensus and 
make decisions for the authority to implement, or the authority will make the decision for 
them-albeit with the information provided by the collaborative body. 
b. Optimal Level of Analysis 
An authoritative strategy operates from the highest level of an 
organization. The top of the organization addresses problems, makes decisions, and 
informs the organization of the decisions. The majority of the organization has little or 
no say in the content or implementation of those decisions. In this case, it is possible-
even likely-for the organization to falter or fail, because those executing the decisions 
are not included in the details of the problem solving and decision-making process. 
A collaborative strategy works up from the lowest levels of an 
organization and thus ensures consideration of everyone's interests. Thus, the 
collaborative body may not have the ability to implement the agreed upon decisions. 
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Reaching some sort of consensus is one thing, having the ability to implement it is quite 
another. 
A hybrid strategy works from both levels. A collaborative body meets and 
discusses all the issues important to the various stakeholders. The group passes the 
products of the collaboration to the authoritative body, which then can discuss the 
relevance and feasibility of that information to the overall problem and base their 
decisions on that information. The decisions will not necessarily be favorable to all 
stakeholders, but the authoritative body will at least be aware of the possible impact the 
decisions will have on behalf of the stakeholders. 
c. Legitimacy 
Another criterion for judging the suitability of the strategy is the degree to 
which it enhances stakeholder legitimacy. A strictly authoritative strategy does not 
require stakeholder approval, outside those few stakeholders invited to participate in the 
decision making body.129 Accordingly, stakeholders outside the decision making body 
are unheard. The collaborative component of the hybrid strategy legitimizes stakeholders 
by including them in the process while the authoritative component demands that 
stakeholders accept the authority of the decision making body, if agreement is not 
forthcoming from the collaborative process. 
d. Risks 
An essential element of collaboration is "acknowledging the legitimate 
differences in how parties perceive the problem .... Depending on how one visualizes the 
129 Roberts, "Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution," 8. 
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risks involved, very different conceptions of the problem arise and different solution 
preferences emerge."130 Stakeholders have a tendency to believe their perception of the 
problem is most important and to ignore or de-emphasize the perception of others. "For 
example, project proposers and government regulators typically adopt a very technical 
view of the issues. They use existing knowledge to predict the probability of certain 
hazards (based on statistical averages) and design solutions to prevent mishap based on 
those probabilities."131 However, even experts disagree on those technical models, so 
stakeholders are able to find an "expert" to give credibility to their own ideas and beliefs. 
This enhances the need for dialogue among the participants to understand and legitimize 
each other's perception of risk. 
" ... Lay perception of environmental risks may be one of the most 
important potential impediments to successful conversion and realizing reuse goals 
requires the development of mechanisms that can secure local stakeholders' trust and 
consent."132 In Negotiating Hazardous Waste Facility Siting and Permitting Agreements, 
M.L.P. Elliot "has classified lay publics according to three perceptions of risk: sponsors, 
guardians, and preservationists."133 Sponsors believe utilizing current technology and 
enforcing regulations achieves minimal risk. Guardians "do not trust technology per se 
130 Barbara Gray, Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty 
Problems, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989), 251. 
131 Gray, Collaborating, 251. 
132 Szasz and Meuser, 4 of 22. 
133 M.L.P. Elliott, "The Effect of Differing Assessments of Risk in Hazardous 
Waste Facility Siting Negotiations," in Negotiating Hazardous Waste Facility Siting and 
Permitting Agreements, ed. G. Bingham and T. Mealey (Washington, D.C.: Conservation 
Foundation, 1988), 9; quoted in Gray, Collaborating, 252. 
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or its operators,"134 and prefer independent monitoring by the local community to 
manage the risk. Preservationists prefer the status quo. They would rather continue with 
the certainty of the present situation than deal with the uncertain outcome of a proposed 
project. The views of all three classes of stakeholders require dialogue to expose 
conflicting assumptions and stakeholders' perceptions. Otherwise, opposition is certain. 
The hybrid strategy must satisfy all three classes of stakeholders. First, 
the sponsors need accurate technical information and the regulatory agencies can provide 
this. Second, by including the guardians (regulatory agencies) in a proactive rather than a 
reactive role, the decision and implementation of the plan is certain to meet existing 
regulations. Lastly, "for preservationists, the incentives to go forward must be 
increased."135 By showing this group that it is better to go forward than allow the 
hazardous waste to remain in place, and that going forward is the safest option, they will 
tend to become ardent supporters of removing the waste as well. 
e. Power 
There are two aspects of power at work in our strategy, shared power and 
coercive power. While the authority requires the concentration of coercive power, 
collaboration requires the sharing of power. Ensuring all stakeholders are equal is vital to 
achieving collaboration. If some stakeholders perceive others as having greater power, 
and the greater influence that comes along with that, they will be dissatisfied with the 
process and will seek other avenues to achieve their goals. In a strictly collaborative 
134 Gray, 252. 
135 Ibid. 
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strategy, there is a dispersion of uncontested power.136 Stakeholders should be 
encouraged to realize the collective power of the group. The self-regulating nature of a 
collaborative effort keeps power brokers and those who abuse their power in check. If 
the collaboration does not succeed in building consensus and making the decision, then 
the authority requires the concentration of coercive power to make and implement the 
decision unilaterally. 
E. EVALUATION OF THE HYBRID STRATEGY 
The measures of success for solving a tame problem simply do not apply 
to wicked problem solving. 
- E. Jeffrey Conklin and William Weil 
To define "success" in the implementation of the proposed strategy, one must 
identify evaluation criteria for the strategy's two objectives. The primary objective is to 
produce results. In the Fort Ord case, the primary objective is to reintegrate the land into 
the local community. The secondary objective is to foster a collaborative environment 
for the stakeholders to work together in solving future challenges in the community. In 
the next two sections, we identify criteria to evaluate the extent to which the two 
objectives of the strategy have been successfully accomplished. 
136 Roberts, "Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution," 6-12. 
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Figure 3. Simple Schematic Diagram of the Hybrid Strategy 
1. Evaluation Criteria for Primary Objective 
Figure 3 above is a graphical representation of the hybrid strategy. This is a 
simplified schematic and the feedback loops can complicate the process, but it gives a 
basic :framework from which to develop evaluation criteria. It gives eight criteria on 
which to evaluate the primary objective. 
a. Authority Established 
The hybrid strategy uses a fallback authority to provide incentive for the 
stakeholders to collaborate, so a prerequisite for the stakeholders to participate is the 
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establishment of the authority. Some higher level of authority in the federal or state 
government must establish this authoritative entity, and the stakeholders must recognize 
the entity's coercive power to make and implement decisions if necessary. 
b. Collaborative Body Established 
The hybrid strategy uses a collaborative body to empower the stakeholders 
to make a decision for the good of the community. The convening authority for the 
collaborative body must identify the stakeholders and invite them to participate. The 
collaborative body must be allocated the resources necessary for meeting and 
administration. 
c. Collaborative Body Addresses Issues 
The collaborative body must engage in dialogue to generate a common 
understanding of the issue's underlying assumptions and address each of the four 
characteristics of the wicked problem. It must search for a common definition of the 
problem. It must identify the stakeholders and their interests in the outcome. It must 
identify the constraints that affect the problem and evaluate potential solutions to the 
problem based on the common definition, the understanding of each other's interests, and 
the constraints affecting the problem. 
d. The Collaborative Body Makes a Recommendation 
Ideally, if the collaborative body meets the criteria set forth in the 
previous paragraph and makes a recommendation on a course of action that is acceptable 
to all of the participants, and if the authority concurs with it, then the authority only has 
to implement the recommendation. If the collaborative body cannot reach a consensus on 
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a recommendation, then it falls upon the authority to address the issue and make a 
decision. 
e. Does the Authority Concur with the Recommendation? 
The authority must concur with the recommendation it receives from the 
collaborative body. If the recommendation is acceptable, then the authority will 
implement it. If, however, the authority rejects the recommendation, then the 
collaborative body will readdress it with the feedback provided by the authority. 
f. The Authority Makes a Decision 
Although a much smaller group of stakeholders comprises the authority 
compared to the collaborative body, at least if the decision falls to the authority, then it 
would have the information, alternatives, and reasoning provided by the collaborative 
body. With this input from the larger group of stakeholders, the authority would review 
each issue and make an informed decision. 
g. Do Stakeholders Challenge the Authority's Decision? 
If the stakeholders do not challenge the authority's decision, then 
implementation would proceed. If the stakeholders challenge the authority's decision, 
then the decision is reviewed. 
h. Is the Authority's Decision Upheld by Review? 
Upon review, the decision can either be upheld or overturned. If the 
decision is upheld, then the authority has been maintained and the decision is 
implemented. If overturned, then the implementation of the strategy has failed. 
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2. Evaluation Criteria for Secondary Objective 
Gray (2000) provided five criteria to evaluation of collaboration.137 The 
evaluation criteria for the primary objective listed above address Gray's first criterion of 
"problem solution." To evaluate the second objective of the hybrid strategy, we use the 
remaining four of lenses and add a fifth lens of our own. 
a. Social Capital Formation 
The criterion of social capital formation relates to the desired output of 
increased trust amongst the stakeholders, and it must rely on an assessment of each 
stakeholder' s opinions of the other stakeholders. One desired output of the strategy is to 
increase the level of trust and honesty amongst the stakeholders. Lawsuits indicate 
distrust amongst the stakeholders. 
b. Shared Meaning 
For collaboration to be successful, stakeholders must forge a common 
definition of the problem, and agree on the causes of the problem and its potential 
solution. 
c. Network Structure 
The criterion of network structure seeks to evaluate the density of 
interactions among the stakeholders. If the collaboration succeeds, the density of 
interactions among the stakeholders should increase. The density of interactions should 
also show different patterns over time as the collaborative body enters into different 
137 Barbara Gray, "Assessing Inter-Organizational Collaboration: Multiple 
Conceptions and Multiple Methods," paper prepared for Perspectives on Collaboration, 
28 October 1998. We derived the five criteria of evaluation from Gray's five conceptual 
perspectives on assessment. 
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phases of the collaborative process. For example, the enthusiasm about a collaborative 
event might prompt a sudden increase in the number of interactions or the interactions 
might dwindle as conflict and disruption occur. 
d. Power Distribution 
Power distribution examines the extent to which power is centralized in 
the hands of a few or distributed evenly among the participating stakeholders. The intent 
of the hybrid strategy is to equalize the stakeholders' power throughout the collaborative 
process. Only if the authority were called upon to break a stalemate, would the 
centralized power be activated. 
e. Sustainability 
Sustainability refers to the ability of the stakeholders to continue the 
collaborative spirit created in this problem-solving process and to transfer it to cope with 
other problems. In the building removal example, if our strategy achieved sustainable 
results, then the stakeholders should be able to continue their collaborative effort in 
addressing the other subsets of the Fort Ord reuse wicked problem. Each of the previous 
four lenses-social capital generation, shared meaning, network structure, and power 
distribution-all contribute to the sustainability of the strategy, because they all address 
the strategy's second objective of fostering a collaborative environment. 
F. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we focused on coping strategies and illustrated their applicability 
in the Fort Ord case. We began by examining previous reuse planning efforts and their 
consequences. Given the less than successful results of previous attempts, we then 
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identified a new strategy for wicked base closure problems and defined criteria to 
evaluate it. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In solving a wicked problem, you have to stop at some point, and declare that "this is the 
problem we've addressed, and this is our solution." 
E. Jeffrey Conklin and William Weil 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis addressed the research questions: What are wicked problems and how 
do we cope with them? To illustrate its military applicability, we examined the following 
subsidiary research questions: Is building removal at the former Fort Ord a wicked 
problem? If so, what strategy should the Army employ to deal with it? 
B. ANSWERS 
A wicked problem has four characteristics. There is no definitive statement of the 
problem. Instead, many diverse and conflicting stakeholders force changing constraints 
in the midst of trying to solve the problems. Unfortunately, they are unable to agree on a 
problem definition or its solution. Once engaged in a wicked problem, stakeholders must 
develop and implement coping strategies. Three strategies drawn from the literature and 
one introduced by this research have been identified. When applying this framework to 
building removal at the former Fort Ord, we find that it meets all the characteristics that 
define a wicked problem. In addition, we found that stakeholders have attempted to use 
authoritative, competitive, and collaborative coping strategies, although none of these 
strategies has proven successful thus far. We propose a hybrid strategy that combines 
aspects of the authoritative and collaborative strategies. We believe that a hybrid strategy 
incorporated at the beginning of the BRAC process would have a higher probability of 
success in the future. However, it is uncertain if a hybrid strategy could overcome the 
91 
distrust and animosity that has developed between the stakeholders at Fort Ord after years 
of unproductive wrangling. 
C. LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This case is a very similar to the situation on approximately 20 other recently 
closed bases in California and an additional 150 bases across the country. Many of those 
bases also have World War II-vintage wood buildings containing asbestos and LBP.138 
However, this thesis only examined one base, so without further research our conclusions 
should be regarded as tentative. Our time was limited and further research is warranted 
to evaluate the applicability of our conclusions to other base closures. 
D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In today's climate of fiscal restraint, the U.S. needs to save money wherever and 
however it can. The primary purpose of base closure is to reduce the amount of money 
spent on excess infrastructure in order to fund requirements that are more critical, such as 
military readiness and modernization. Spending money on closing bases does nothing to 
directly improve or maintain our warfighting capability. On 27 Feb 2001, Senator Carl 
Levin (D-MI) stated, "Every year that we delay another base closure round, we waste 
about $1.5 billion in annual savings that we can never recoup. And every dollar we waste 
138 Another base in California, Camp Roberts, has tried to implement large-scale 
building removal that is sensitive to environmental needs and in the process created a 
huge pile of hazardous waste. That hazardous waste still requires removal and it is 
unknown how or when that will occur. Additionally, hazardous waste landfills are filling 
up and are becoming harder to site. 
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on bases we do not need is a dollar we cannot spend on things we do need." 139 Senator 
John McCain (R-AZ) recently sponsored new legislation to conduct two more rounds of 
BRAC in 2003 and 2005. If the Department of Defense is to realize the financial benefits 
it seeks from future rounds of base closure, then it must incorporate lessons from 
previous base closures into the legislation and implementation of the BRAC process. 
The Fort Ord experience in preparation and implementation of its 
[Base Reuse Plan] has firmly established that cooperation, good will, and 
mutual respect between local civilian and on-base military leaders which 
has occurred at Fort Ord is essential. Without these collaborative efforts, 
the transition from military to civilian use can be long, difficult and 
counterproductive.140 
While Fort Ord was declared the National Model for base closure in 1993, this 
thesis has shown that the transition has been "long, difficult, and counterproductive" with 
no end in sight. Environmental restoration of Fort Ord and turnover of the land to the 
local community has not set an example for others to follow. If the closure of Fort Ord is 
to be the example for base closings throughout the country, then it is necessary to 
accomplish two objectives: 
• Develop a process to make and successfully implement decisions in the 
wicked problem environment of base closure. 
• Incorporate the lessons learned at the outset for future base closures to achieve 
the most timely and cost-effective results. 
As in any other arena of planning or policy debate, wicked problems confound base 
139 Keith J. Costa, "Warner: 'Comprehensive Evaluation' Needed Before New 
Base Closures," Inside The Pentagon, 22 March 2001, 2. 
140 Fort Ord Reuse Authority, Fort Ord Base Reuse Plan (Marina: Fort Ord 
Reuse Authority, 12 December 1994), 3. Emphasis added. 
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closures. If we are to accomplish these two objectives, we must develop the processes 
and administrative skills necessary to cope with such problems. These administrative 
skills would include such things as problem solving under conditions of complexity, 
interdependence, and "anarchy" and collaborative leadership that invites the participation 
of community stakeholders. 
The military is like insurance; nobody wants to spend the money for the coverage, 
but everyone must. How much insurance is enough? Funds are limited, and defense has 
to compete for funding with areas such as agriculture and education. To ensure that 
funding goes to preserving and improving our warfighting capability in areas such as 
manpower, research and development, and procurement, base closure needs to be as 
efficient and effective as possible. Money spent on closing bases does not buy that 
needed insurance. A strong and ready military secures this. nation and base closure is 
necessary to maintain that security. Thus, base closure activities subserve the greater 
security issues faced by this country and given their status as wicked problems deserve 







D Municipal I Executive Government 
D Legislative I Political 
D Public Interest 
D Environmentalist 
D Other: ______ _ 
Categorize the Stakeholder's Interests: 
D Political 
D Financial I Economic 









D Neutral I Don't Care 
D Other: 
What is the Stakeholder's status? 
D Active - Positive 
0 Active - Negative 
D Passive- Wait and See 




What are the stakeholder's interests? 
Describe how the Stakeholder interacts with FORA: 
What are the Stakeholder's sources of power? 
Sketch an administrative organizational chart showing for whom the Stakeholder 
works, who works for the stakeholder, and where FORA fits into the chart. 
Sketch a financial or resource flow-chart for the stakeholder. 
Did the interview give you any ideas for common ground with other 
Stakeholders? (Follow-up by informing Stan of these ideas and asking the Stakeholder 
for feedback) 
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